As has been frequently noted, political science is pre-paradigmatic or is at least confronted with a number of contending paradigms. In political science. Jargon, while seeking precision, frequently only compounds confusion. In quest of rigor, but lacking a scientific paradigm, social scientists do not always use jargon in the same way, and, worse, some social scientists are not even consistent in their own usage at different times. The issue of jargon is especially germane to the conceptual frame-, works constructed about structural-functional and systems analysis.
Perspective and Conceptual Framework
From its beginnings in the late nineteenth century, the functional approach in the social sciences has been caught up in terminological confusion. "Too often," Robert Merton has written, "a single term has been used to symbolize different concepts, just as the same concept has been symbolized by different terms. Clarity of analysis and adequacy of communication are both victims of this frivolous use of words."'
The word function is used with a variety of meanings: occasion, use, aim, consequence, activity, purpose, effect, motive, and so on. Its most precise usage is in mathematics, "where it refers to a variable considered in relation to one or more other variables in terms of which it may be expressed or on the value of which its own value depends."2 In this sense, for example, the rapidly expanding population of the developing areas is primarily a function of declining death rates. From this notion, the social sciences use the phrases "functional interdependence" and "functional relations."
The origins of functionalism in the social sciences are linked most directly to organicism and, specifically, to homeostatic physiology.3 The term function, in this usage, is adapted from the biological sciences, where it refers to the "vital or organic processes considered in the respects in which they contribute to the maintenance of the organism."4
The premise of functional (or structural-functional) analysis "is nothing less than to provide a consistent and integrated theory from which can be derived explanatory hypotheses relevant to all aspects" of a given social system. The approach is characterized by certain common features: "first, an emphasis on the whole system as the unit of analysis;
second, postulation of particular functions as requisite to the mainte-

nance of the whole system; third, concern to demonstrate the functional interdependence of diverse structures within the whole system-"5 The principal objective of functional analysis is to determine the contribution which a social item (a structure or process) makes to the persistence of the system in which it occurs, that is, the role it plays in maintaining the system within specified limits.
The logic of functional analysis, following Merton, involves the following sequence of steps:
First of all, certain functional requirements of the organism [or the social system] are established, requirements which must be satisfied if the organism is to survive, or to operate with some degree of effectiveness- Second, there is a concrete and detailed description of the arrangements (structures and processes) through which these requirements are typically met in 'normal' cases. Third, if some of the typical mechanisms for meeting these requirements are destroyed, or are found to be functioning inadequately, the observer is sensitized to the need for detecting compensating mechanisms (if any) which fulfill the necessary function. Fourth, and implicit in all that precedes, there is a detailed account of the structure for which the functional requirements hold, as well as a detailed account of the arrangements through which the function is fulfilled.8
Marion Levy states the problem of functional analysis in ordinary language: What must be done if a society is to persist? How must what must be done be done?7
While functionalism has been one of the dominant modes of analysis in the social sciences, it has suffered continuous attack on charges that it is "illogical, value-laden, and incapable of explaining anything."8 Functionalism has been criticized as verbally obscure; methodologically ambiguous; teleological; conservative and ethnocentric; incapable of dealing adequately with change; empirically untestable; and lacking in both explanatory and predictive power.

Historically, writes Carl Hempel. "functional analysis is a modification of teleological explanation, i.e., of explanation not by reference to causes which 'bring about' the event in question, but by reference to ends which determine its course."9 The final cause is presumed to determine the behavior of the system and to "explain" a given social item. Here function closely approximates purpose. This teleological perspective forms "the image of deliberate purposive behavior or of systems working in accordance with a preconceived design." There is no empirical criterion, however, for the attribution of purpose, and to do so "tends to encourage the illusion that a profound type of understanding is achieved."10
The roots of functional analysis are found in the work of Emile Durkheim, but the British anthropologist Radcliffe-Brown made its formulation as an approach explicit. The concept of social function is based, in his words, "on an analogy between social life and organic life."11 It is, as Radcliffe-Brown well knew, a venerable analogy. It is also an analogy which Chalmers Johnson has termed "uncritical."12
For RadcIiffe-Brown, individual human beings are "the essential units" of analysis and are connected by networks of social relations into an integrated whole. "The function of any recurrent activity ... is the part it plays in the social life. as a whole and therefore the contribution it makes to the maintenance of the structural continuity."13 Malinow-ski, with his own variety of functionalism, shared this theoretical perspective. He sought "the explanation of anthropological facts at all levels of development by their function, by the part which they play within the integral system of culture, by the manner in which they are related to each other within the system. .. ."*4
"Chair-Tiers Johnson. Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), p. 49. See also Robert A. Nisbet. "Reflections on a Metaphor." in Social Change and History (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 240-304. There he writes, "Generalization is beyond question what we seek from the empirical and concrete. But is is generalization from the empirical, the concrete, and the historical; not generalization achieved through their dismissal; not generalization drawn from metaphor and analogy." (pp. 303-4.)
"A. R. RadcIiffe-Brown, "On the Concept of Function in Social Science," American Anthropologist 37 (I935): 395-96, quoted in Merton. Social Theory and Social Structure. p. 22.
"Bronislaw Malinowski, "Anthropology," Encyclopedia Brilannica, First Supplementary Volume (London and New York: 1926). pp. 132-3. quoted in Merton, Soda! Theory and Social Structure, p. 22. For a fine discussion of the role that leading anthropologists have played in the development of the functional approach, see Maurice Mandelbaum, "Funclionatism in Social Anthropology," in Sidney Morgenbesser et al,. eds.. Philosophy. Science, and Method (New York: Sl. Martin's Press, 1969), pp. 306-32.

The functional analysis of RadcIiffe-Brown, Malinowski/ and other early anthropologists has been described as "a dead horse" and of an extreme form which no longer fairly characterizes contemporary functionalism.15 Robert Merton, in his classic study of functional analysis, identifies three postulates associated with classical functionalism:
first, that standardized social activities or cultural items are functional for the entire social or cultural system; second, that al! such social and cultural items fulfill sociological functions; and third, that these are consequently indispensable.18
Merton argues, however, that these postulates are in fact unnecessary to the functional orientation. Nevertheless, even the most sophisticated functionalists remain vulnerable to the problems arising from these three interconnected postulates.
The first postulate, that of the functional unity of society, is explicit in the work of Radclirfe-Brown: "The function of a particular social usage is the contribution it makes to the total social life as the functioning of the total social system." This implies, he says, the "functional unity" of the social system. Functional unity is defined as "a condition in which all parts of the social system work together with a sufficient degree of harmony or internal consistency, i.e., without producing persistent conflicts which can neither be resolved nor regulated."17
In identifying "system-relevant" functions, few analysts specify the reciprocal relations among these functions. Despite the assumption that the functions are necessarily interrelated, the linkage is rarely articulated. The degree of integration is an empirical variable and is subject to verification- All societies are not equally well-integrated. Changes may occur in the degree of integration within a society over time as well as in the variation among different societies. Functions themselves may also vary in relative significance for system maintenance both over time and in different systems.18 Beyond this, the postu-
"Pierre L. Van den Berghe, "Dialectic and Functionalism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis," American Sociological Review 28 (October 1963): 695. Van den Berghe, En attempting a theoretical synthesis between functionalism and dialectics, argues for the postulate of dynamic equilibrium as "the real cornerstone" of the functional approach. He presents "an expanded model of equilibrium" so as to allow for "the possibility of maladjustive change, of vicious circles of malintegration, and of abrupt 'social mutations' through revolution." (pp. 697-98.)
'^Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, - p. 25.
"RadcIiffe-Brown, "On the Concept of Function." p. 397, quoted in Merton. Social Theory and Social Structure, pp. 25-26.
"Robert T. Golembiewski, William A. Welsh, and William J, Grotty, A Methodological Primer for Political Scienlisis (Chicago; Rand McNally, 1969). p, 253.

late of functional unity may divert the analyst's attention from the possible disparate consequences of a particular social item for diverse groups within the society or for individuals within these groups.19 In order to deal with the multiple consequences any given item may have, Merton distinguishes between functions and dysfunctions. Functions, for Merton, are those "observed consequences which make for the adaptation or adjustment of a given system." Dysfunctions are those which lessen adaptation or adjustment.20
At any given instant, an item may have both functional and dysfunctional consequences. It is always necessary to distinguish the object:
functional or dysfunctional in relation to what? What may be functional for the society as a whole may be dysfunctional for subsystems within the society. The unity of a total society cannot be taken as an assumption. Functional analysis requires the specification of the units for which a given social item is functional, and the analysis must allow for the possibility of diverse consequences. A given social item may be either functional or dysfunctional, or may be functional at one level and dysfunctional at another.21
The second postulate, universal functionalism, holds that all standardized social or cultural forms have positive functions.22 Malinowski states this in its most extreme form; "The functional view of culture insists ... upon the principle that in every type of civilization, every custom, material object, idea and belief fulfills some vital function.23 The basic notion here is that whatever is is useful and serves some vital purpose in the maintenance and integration of the social system-in short, that it is functional.
A particular item, however, may be either functional or dysfunctional, or, at the same time, have both functional and dysfunctional consequences. As the same item may have multiple functions, all may not be intended, or, for that matter, even known. Merton distinguishes between manifest and latent functions- Manifest functions are those intended and recognized by participants within the system- Latent func-

Funcfionalism and ^systems analysis rations are those which are neither intended nor recognized-24 The concept of latent function sensitizes the analyst to the varied and disparate consequences of a function and directs his attention toward a range of consequences beyond the avowed "purpose" of a given function.25 Marion Levy further distinguishes between those functions which may be unintended but recognized and those intended but unrecognized. "These concepts focus attention on the level of explicitness and sensitivity of the members of a given system to the structures in terms of which they operate."26
The third postulate, indispensability, follows directly from the second, holding that whatever is is not merely functional, but also necessary. Thus, Malinowski says that each cultural item, in fulfilling some vital function, "represents an indispensable part within a working whole."27
A function is value-neutral. An item may be functional to the maintenance of a system, but is not necessarily, in normative terms, good or preferred. Preference is the product of a socially conditioned perspective. What is functional to a repressive political system will surely not be valued by the analyst merely because it is functional. The is, however, has all too often been confused with the ought. The emphasis on system maintenance and adaptation has carried a conservative bias, a justification and rationalization of the status quo. This reflects, in part, the conservative origins of sociology as a discipline, but the conservatism of functionalism lies less in the nature of the approach itself than in its practitioners who may endow the analytical model with normative value. Alexis de Tocqueville warned against the confusion of the familiar with the necessary: "what we call necessary institutions are often no more than institutions to which we have grown accustomed."28
The functional model tends to stress continuity over change; at a certain level, stability is assumed for analytic purposes.29 A model of society in terms of integration and order may provide the criterion, in the form of an ideal type, by which conflict and change may be exam-

ined,30 The analysis of conflict and change as deviations from the '"norm" leads in practice, however, to the frequent assumption that integration and order are in fact normal and that whatever contributes to the maintenance of a given system is not only functional/ but good.
Functional Inilispensabslity
Kenneth Sherrill31 has explored some of the problems of functional indispensability in his analysis of Almond and Verba's The Civic Culture. Almond and Verba posit the existence of" an ideal set of orientations toward politics, or a political culture, which they term a "civic culture." This culture is "mixed" in that it is characterized by a particular combination of three citizenship orientations: the participant, the subject, and the parochial. Each citizen is also characterized individually by such a mixture.32 Almond and Verba select the United States and Great Britain as "representing relatively successful experiments in democratic government. An analysis of these two cases will tell us," they say, "what kinds or attitudes are associated with stably functioning democratic systems, the quantitative incidence of these attitudes, and their distribution among different groups in the population."33
Not surprisingly, four hundred pages after deciding to use the United States and Great Britain as their standards. Almond and Verba find that these two nations most closely approximate what they have called the "civic culture."34 This, of course, is considered the most desirable mixture of people and orientations. From the assumption that the two nations are successful stable democracies characterized by a cultural "mix" at a particular time (the survey was conducted in 1959-1960), functional value is then given to the peculiar character of the mix. If the United States and Britain have a certain proportion of people with subject and parochial orientations, that is, with low levels of political knowledge, efficacy, and participation, then the maintenance of such patterns becomes "necessary" for the stability and persistence of these

systems.35 In other words. Almond and Verba assume that the "civic culture" is the only cultural mix consistent with democratic society, when, in fact, all that they have shown is that the particular mix is associated with those societies identified as most democratic.
Sherrill identifies another serious problem in the apparent assumption that the three types of citizens-participants, subjects and parochials- are randomly distributed within the population. The case studies of subjects and parochials presented by Almond and Verba would suggest otherwise. Deprivations are cumulative: Parochials tend to be disproportionately poor, uneducated, rural, and, in the United States, black, Mexican-American, and Appalachian white. "If maintaining the mix means maintaining the pattern of life to be found in the rural south of the United States," Sherrill argues, "then the value of the mix must be weighed against other, and perhaps higher, social values."36
In assuming universal and indispensable functional qualities for all aspects of the system, Almond and Verba unwittingly rationalize poverty and social injustice in the name of democratic stability. It appears that their norm is stability, not democracy. In the concluding chapter, they argue that
if politics becomes intense, and if it remains intense because of some salient issue, the inconsistency between attitude and behavior will become unstable. But any relatively permanent resolution of the inconsistency is likely to have unfortunate consequences. If behavior is brought into line with attitudes, the amount of attempted control of elites by nonelites will create governmental ineffectiveness and instability. On the other hand, if attitudes change to match behavior, the resulting sense of impotence and noninvolvement will have damaging consequences for the democratic quality of the political system.37
This fear of mass political participation is also embedded in the pluralist notion that apathy is functional to democratic stability. Empirical research establishes that there are large portions of the populations of even the most participant political systems, like the United States, which are uninvolved, uninformed, and apathetic about politics. Such
"Sherrill notes, however, that "the question remains as to why it is necessary to have certain people in the system who are subjects or parochials, even though their ideal 'citizen' combines his participant orientation with these other two orientations," "Political Modernization as an Attitudinal Syndrome," p. 5.
"Ibid.. p, 6. Also seeSatish Arora, "Pre-Empled Future? Notes on Theories of Political Development," Behavioral Sciences and Community Development (India) 2 (September 1968): 111-15.
"Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, p. 483.

apathy is the^ regarded as contributing to democratic stability by insuring that political conflict involves neither large numbers of people nor those who operate with an intensity unmediated by the "bargaining culture" produced by the pluralistic pattern of crosscutting social cleavages. In the b^st-selling introductory text. The Politics of American Democracy. Irish and Prothro write, "Many people express undemocratic Principles in response to questioning but are too apathetic to act on their undemocratic opinions in concrete situations. And in most cases, fortunately for the democratic system, those with the most undemocratic oprinciples are also those who are least likely to act."38 "Too many good citizens," they contend, "could actually be bad for the system."39
The postulate of indispensability/ assuming that each element within a system performs some vital function for system survival, goes far beyond the minimum requirements of functional analysis. Merton argues, }\owevef^ that "there are certain functions which are indispensable in the se"se that, unless they are performed, the society (or group OF individual) will not persist."40 This is the concept of functional requisites, those "imperatives" which must be fulfilled if the system is to Persist. Closely related to the concept of functional requisites is that of the functional prerequisites, those functions which must be fulfilled or Pre-exist befo^ a given system can come into being. Despite the fact lhat "embedded in every functional analysis is some conception, tacit or expressed/ of the functional requirements of the system," Merton observes that the functional requisite remains "one of the cloudiest and empirically r^ost debatable concepts in functional theory."41
Levy insists that his requisites for the persistence of a society are not derived merely by definition, but are the minimal implications of the existence of ** society in its setting. They are not empty deductions, but empirical relationships to be independently discovered. Talcott Parsons,
the most prominent functionalist in American sociology,42 argues, however, that social scientists are not yet ready for a precise theoretical formulation of social systems. This admits that the functional requisites on either the general or particular level cannot then be determined.
Parsons "seems prepared to grant that functionalism is, at its best, a programmatic guide to research,"43 For Parsons, functionalism is a theory building strategy, a "theoretical device" for raising significant questions and generating suggestive hypotheses. It is useful. Parsons advises, to conceive of a social entity or process as a system of behavior, having the teleological properties of self-regulation. Insofar as this involves merely the view that the parts of society are interrelated in patterns of behavior about which it is possible to formulate testable hypotheses, then functionalism, as Kingsley Davis contends, is synonymous with sociological analysis,44 Parsons and the proponents of the functional approach, however, are clearly saying more than this.
Parsons, in his model of the social system, constructs an ideal type-He posits four requisite functions, or "functional imperatives," for any system: (1) pattern maintenance, (2) goal attainment, (3) adaptation, and (4) integration.45 "He is not making an empirical statement but is proposing that it would be fruitful to categorize and interpret social structures in terms of their contributions to these functions."46 But despite Parson's caution, he, as so many functionalists, fails to preserve the distinction between the ideal type and empirical reality. "In this way," Harold Kaplan writes, "Parsons' ideal type is transformed into an allegedly accurate portrayal of observable systems,"4T
Flanigan and Fogelman argue that "there are no grounds for supposing that one set and only one set of functions are requisite. The analyst

can define his 'requisite functions' as he pleases, and he can be equally imaginative in locating which structures perform what functions."48 This raises some severe problems in the failure to distinguish empirical and normative criteria. The analyst may well see as necessary those items which constitute for him "good" system adjustment. "The danger is particularly prominent because any 'requisite' is difficult to test, if indeed it does not defy testing."43

The work of Gabriel Almond involves what he calls "the functional approach to comparative politics." As described by Almond in The Politics of Developing Areas, all political systems have four characteristics in common and in terms of which they may be compared. First of all, "political systems, including the simplest ones, have political structure. .. . Second, the same functions are performed in all political systems, even though these functions may be performed with different frequencies, and by different kinds of structures. ... Third, all political structure, no matter how specialized, whether it is found in primitive or in modern societies, is multifunctional.... Fourth, all political systems are mixed systems in the cultural sense. There are no 'all-modern' cultures and structures, in the sense of rationality, and no all-primitive ones, in the sense of traditionality."50 All political systems, in this sense, are transitional.51
Although Almond nowhere offers a specific definition of function, he postulates seven functional requisites which must be fulfilled by any political system. On the political or "input" side are political socialization and recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregation, and political communication. On the governmental or "output" side are rule-making, rule-application, and rule-adjudication.53 The functions

are not of an equivalent nature, in that political communication is a mechanism by which the other functions are performed-output, as well as input, not to mention feedback.
"An adequate analysis of a political system must locate and characterize all of these functions," Almond states, "and not simply those functions performed by the specialized political structure."53 Nowhere, however, does Almond make it clear just why these functions, and not others, are necessary or whether they are sufficient for system maintenance. Almond is deeply sensitive to the parochialism of traditional comparative politics. His "functional categories" were developed for the purpose of comparing whole political systems-Western and non-Western; modern, transitional, and traditional. The functions, however, are highly ethnocentric in their derivation. "The problem essentially was to ask a series of questions based on the distinctive political activities existing in Western complex systems- In other words, we derived our functional categories from the political systems in which structural specialization and functional differentiation have taken place to the greatest extent."54 This requisite assumption provides the Pro-crustean bed to which all systems are fitted- The validity of the assumption cannot be tested: "The same functions may be performed with different frequencies, and by different kinds of structures."55 Thus, each of the seven functions must be fulfilled, by definition, if the system is to be maintained. Since a given system to be analyzed obviously "exists," then the functions are being performed. The problem is to locate the structures, whether institutionalized or intermittent: "If the functions are there, then the structures must be . . -"5S
The functions are offered as a "preliminary" proposal, " and are modified in the development of Almond's work. In Comparative Politics:
A Developmental Approach. Almond and Powell distinguish between three levels of functions, described as "activities."58 On one level are capability functions (regulative, extractive, distributive, and responsive) which determine the performance of the system in its environment. At the second level, the conversion functions (interest articulation, interest aggregation, and political communication; rule-making, rule-application, and rule-adjudication) are internal to the system and involve the input-output flow as the system meets demands with authoritative

decisions. The third level is that of the system maintenance and adaptation functions, specifically political socialization and recruitment. "The theory of the political system will consist of the discovery of the relations between these different levels of functioning-capabilities, conversion functions, and system maintenance )nd adaptation functions-and of the relation of the functions at each level."59
The broader framework is, in part, a response to the less dynamic character of the earlier formulation. Almond seeks "to explore developmental patterns, to explain how political systems change and why they change."60 His political system is one of interdependence, but not necessarily of harmony. He offers a kind of "probabilistic functionalism,"81 but as the framework has expanded, the functional categories seem to have become open-ended. There are presumably other, yet unspecified requisite functions. Almond's use of the term function is hardly precise. but his basic problem-the thorny issue of functional requisites-is shared with Parsons, Levy, and all those who would employ functional analysis.
Political analysis has employed a diversity of requisite functions- "very nearly a unique set for each study." Flanigan and Fogelman contend that "until precise criteria are established for the identification of functions and a theoretically sophisticated argument is made for a particular set of functions," functionalism, as an approach, will be severely limited.62
Closely associated with the identification of requisite functions is the assertion that certain structures are "indispensable for fulfilling each of these functions." Merton contends that the assumption of structural requisites is not only contrary to fact, but diverts attention from the possibility that alternative social structures may serve the functions necessary for the persistence of the system. Functional needs are permissive rather than determinant of special social structures: "just as the same item may have multiple functions, so may the same function be diversely fulfilled by alternative items. " Merton here seeks to sensitize the analyst to the existence of functional alternatives, equivalents, or substitutes.63
Different structures may serve the same requisite, and different requisites may be fulfilled by the same structure. The relations between structures and functions may vary not only between systems, but also over time within a given system. The empirical determination as to
whether or not a given item has functional equivalents can be made only under specified conditions. Hempel argues that "in most, if not all, concrete cases it would be impossible to specify with any precision the range of alternative behavior patterns, institutions, custom, or the tike that would suffice to meet a given functional prerequisite or need. And even if that range could be characterized, there is no satisfactory method in sight for dividing it into some finite number of cases and assigning a probability to each of these.""4

Carl Hempel argues that "functional analysis no more enables us to predict than it enables us to explain the occurrence of a particular one of the items by which a given functional requirement can be met."65 From the postulation of certain functional requisites, the inference is then made as a categorical assertion that the requisites will be satisfied in some way. This assumes self-regulation on the part of the system, that is, v/ithin certain limits of tolerance or adaptability, the system will satisfy tt^e various functional requirements for its persistence by developing the appropriate traits so as to effectively meet any system challenge.66 In this sense, the system is homeostatic. It is a teleologicaL or goal-directed system, and its basic goal is self-maintenance.
Hempel points out, however, that "a formulation proposed as a hypothesis of self-regulation can serve as a basis for explanation or prediction only it it is a reasonably definite statement that permits of objective empirical test. .. . Unfortunately, ... the formulations offered in the context of concrete functional analyses quite often fall short of these general standards." The kind of system or its limit of tolerance within which the functional requirements are satisfied is not adequately indicated.fi7 Ralf Dahrendorf argues that "instead of abstracting a limited number of variables and postulating their relevance for explanation of a particular problem, [functionalism] represents a huge and allegedly all-embracing superstructure of concepts that do not describe, proposi-

tions that do not explain, and models from which nothing follows."68
Part of the difficulty is that the key terms of functional analysis are rarely given operational definitions and thus cannot be put to an objective test.68 One of the most serious problems lies in the meaning of "maintenance," "persistence," or "survival." In biology, as Hempel notes, "survival" of an organism has a fairly clear meaning, but social systems are another matter altogether. There is always the danger of tautology; Requisites are postulated upon which the survival of the system depends, but as the system under analysis has obviously "survived/' then it is assumed that the functional requisites are fulfilled.70 In functional analysis, the definition of system requisites must be supplemented by empirically testable specification of the "normal" or "healthy" state of the system, with clear delineation of the limits of tolerance beyond which the system can be regarded as no longer persisting.71
The concept of integration, as noted earlier, is just as problematic as that of survival. As all societies, over both time and space, will necessarily vary in degree of integration, no society is likely to be perfectly integrated-including those tribal societies from which the early anthropologists/ like Malinowski, derived their vision of harmony.72 The concepts of adjustment and adaptation involve similar problems of specification. In the absence of empirical criteria, the concepts have no definite meaning. Tautologically, any system response might be construed as an adjustment. Subjectively, adjustment might become whatever the analyst regards as "good" for the system in terms of his own values.73
The functional approach may account for the adaptive and modifying dimensions ofi change/ but it cannot adequately confront radical and transforming change. The functional vocabulary reflects in depth this bias, as can be seen in the terminology of the "functional imperatives" of Talcott Parsons- Words such as maintenance, adaptation, and integration occur throughout the functionalist literature. As the challenge of modernization unleashes forces of change throughout the world, the structural-functional approach, at best, permits us to understand change only in terms of system maintenance and preservation. Intrasystemic fluctuations are viewed in the context of homeostasis and equilibrium.

Except in the case of genuinely self-regulating systems, the explanatory power of functional analysis is severely limited, and its predictive significance practically nil." The task of functionalism in the social sciences is to determine the respects and the degrees to which various systems are self-regulating. Failing this, functionalism cannot be regarded as theory, Hempel contends, "but rather as a program for research guided by certain heuristic maxims or 'working hypotheses.' "75
Functional analysis, as an analogy, provides an analytic and heuristic model. It offers taxonomic frameworks and classificatory schemes for collecting and coding research material. This was the conception behind the Little, Brown Series in Comparative Politics. By following a common approach in the analysis of individual countries, utilizing Almond's functional schema, it then becomes possible to compare these countries "systematically and cumulatively." Each country, rather than being treated in more traditional, sui generis fashion, would be examined in terms of common functional categories.76 Because "it provides a set of standardized categories that can be applied successfully over widely disparate political systems," functional analysis has been particularly useful in the study of comparative political systems.77 It does not, however, provide a body of theory, and it has neither explanatory nor
predictive power.
Systems Analysis
The systems approach in political science is closely related to functionalism, both based on a conception of political phenomena as a "system of interrelated and reciprocally regulated patterns of action and orientation, patterns that cluster together in equilibrium and that . . . have certain needs for maintenance and survival."78 Gabriel Almond, in his functional approach, utilizes the concept of the political system instead of the more traditional "state," limited by its legal and institutional connotations.78 Almond distinguishes the political system in terms of a particular set of interactional properties: comprehensiveness/ interdependence, and existence of boundaries.80 In the work of David Easton, o however, the systems approach is most fully articulated.

Easton, in The Political System, published in 1953, offered a major critique of the condition of political science as a discipline. In this deeply o influential book, Easton argued for the use of the systems concept "as an analytical tool designed to identify those integrally related aspects of concrete social reality that can be called political."81 Over the succeeding decade, the development of Easton's systems approach drew heavily on the communications science of cybernetics and on general systems theory, an ambitious attempt to provide an analytical framework for the study of all phenomena, physical and social, as behaving systems.82
Easton wishes to construct an empirically oriented general theory of politics, and to that end, he seeks to define the kinds of functions characteristic of any political system through a systematic framework for political analysis. He examines "the basic processes through which a political system, regardless of its genetic or specific type, is able to
persist as a system of behavior in a world either of stability or of change."83
Easton's analysis rests on four premises;
1. System. It is useful to view political life as a system of behavior.
2. Environment. A system is distinguishable from the environment in which it exists and open to influences from it.
3. Response. Variations in the structures and processes within a system may usefully be interpreted as constructive or positive alternative efforts by members of a system to regulate or cope with stress flowing from environmental as well as internal sources.
4. Feedback. The capacity of a system to persist in the face of stress is a function of the presence and nature of the information and other influences that return to its actors and decision-makers.'4
As conceived by Easton, systems analysis
takes its departure from the notion of political life as a boundary-maintaining set of interactions imbedded in and surrounded by other social systems to the influence of which it is constantly exposed. As such, it is helpful to interpret political phenomena as constituting an open system, one that must cope with the problems generated by its exposure to influences from these environmental systems. If a system of this kind is to persist through time, it must obtain adequate feedback about its past performances, and it must be able to take measures that regulate its future behavior. Regulation may call for simple adaptation to a changing setting in the light of fixed goals. But it may also include efforts to modify old goals or transform them entirely. Simple adaptation may not be enough. To persist it may be necessary for a system to have the capacity to transform its own internal structure and processes.85 (see figure 5.)
The pattern of analysis involves the examination of the following variables:
first, the nature of the inputs;
second, the variable conditions under which they will constitute a stressful disturbance on the"system;
\ third, the environmental and systemic conditions that generate such \ stressful conditions;
\ fourth, the typical ways in which systems have sought to
cope with stress; o
' fifth, the role of information feedback; and, finally, sixth, the part that outputs play in these conversion and coping processes.a>-
Easton emphasizes the analytic character of systems: "all systems are \ constructs of the mind.""7 What constitutes a system is determined by definition and is not given in nature. Nothing is gained theoretically by designating some systems as "natural," for the point at which a system of interrelated variables ceases to be a system and emerges as only a random collection remains indeterminant.68 All systems involve variables which are, more or less, interrelated. Easton suggests that "any set of variables selected for description and explanation may be considered a system of behavior." The problem is "to decide whether the set of activities is an interesting one" insofar as it is relevant and advances our theoretical understanding. The criteria for the determination of what is to be included within the political system is purely instrumental. "Logically, therefore, we are free to include within a political system any { range of actions at all; substantively, in the light of the objectives of ^ research with regard to political life, we are limited by our conception -3 of what is significant and relevant for an understanding of why people y> act in the way that they do in political situations."89
Political systems are analytical constructs in yet another way. They involve an abstraction of the political from the reality of the larger

matrix of human behavior. The political system is made up of roles, not of individuals, and is defined in terms of the political aspects of social action. It cannot be concretely separated. Any action may be at once both political and non-political in various aspects. Prayer would seem to be a solely religious act, but when it occurs in a public school, it enters the political system. Voting, on the other hand, is a political act, yet it may have specifically non-political aspects, as, for example, in a case where voting reflects a desire for social acceptance rather than political preference. Thus, in this sense, the political system is not a physical entity, but it is, as a pattern of interaction, empirically observable.80
Offering these caveats, Easton himself then breathes life into his political system in such a way as to endow it with teleological character. It is "a goal-setting, self-transforming, and creatively adaptive system."91 The analytic construct takes on a certain concreteness. Easton speaks of the "life processes of political systems"92 and argues that "the primary goal of political analysis is to understand how political systems manage to persist through time."93 He gives little attention to their transformation or "death."
Easton assumes that "there are certain basic political activities and processes characteristic of all political systems even though the structural forms through which they manifest themselves may and do vary considerably in each place and each age."91 The requisite function of any political system, and the criteria by which its boundaries are defined. is "the authoritative allocation of values for a society,"95 that is, the process of how binding decisions are made and implemented for a society. Values refer to those things, material goods or symbolic re-\ A wards, which people want. They are, by definition, scarce. Allocations | are those decisions and related activities that distribute, grant, or deny ( values in the society. Allocations are authoritative when decisions are o accepted as legitimate and binding, for whatever reason-threat of force, self-interest, or recognition of legitimacy. The requirement that .; such allocations be for a society distinguishes those decisions made for . the inclusive social system from those in subsystems which may resolve ^ conflict through authoritative allocations of values, but for a limited
membership, as in a family, church, association, or local body of government. The set of activities related to authoritative allocations for the society as a whole Easton terms "the political system."
In all societies, scarcity leads to conflict and the demands for conflict resolution. Where disputes over the allocation of values cannot be "resolved independently and where they are also perceived to be excessively disruptive of the prevailing ideas of order and justice/ every society provides for processes through which special structures either aid in achieving some regulation of the differences or impose a settlement."98 Insofar as the authority is regarded as legitimate, the imposed settlement, ultimately backed by the threat of physical coercion, will be accepted as binding by most members of the society, even by those who may be adversely affected by the decision.91
The boundaries of the political system are determined by whether the interactions are predominantly oriented toward the authoritative allocation of values for a society. What remains outside the political system constitutes the environment, to which the political system is open and responsive- The elements of the differentiated environment-the ecological, biological, personality, and social systems-are taken as "given" and represent the independent variables or parameters of the political system.98

Changes in the environment relevant to the political system are conceptualized by Easton as inputs, summary variables of demands and support. Demands represent the politicization of raw wants or preferences. As these preferences are articulated, they are "put into" the political system as demands that the authorities respond to these self-conscious needs, that the government do something. The volume and variety of demands are regulated by certain structures-interest groups, parties, opinion leaders, or the mass media-which aggregate and articulate the often diffuse and undifferentiated demands made on authorities- By drawing the disparate variety of demands together in a workable and simplified program for action, the system can presumably respond more . effectively. Beyond these structural regulators, many cultural restraints serve to modify potential demands arising from the environment. While the sphere of every political system has increasingly expanded, certain
kinds of wants may still be regarded as inappropriate for political settlement."9
One of the most effective sources of demand regulation is in the differential access which members may have to the political system. All members are not likely to enjoy meaningful access and are not "equally likely to give voice to a demand."100 The members of a political system will differ widely in their political capital-money, status, prestige, and numbers. With limited resources, the authorities of any political system will respond most effectively to those demands from members with political capital, upon whom they are ultimately dependent for support. In this sense, the mode of analysis reflects an elitist orientation: emphasis is almost entirely on politically relevant members of the system.101 The model suggests a game of extortion, and, indeed, no political system operates on solely altruistic lines. But Easton's model never really comes to terms with what implicitly underlies the whole process. If ultimately authority is backed by a "monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force,"102 all members of the political system are at least potentially equal. In a Hobbesian sense, violence gives to each member political capital to which the system must be responsive-either through repression or in meeting the demands which may be expressed, as in a ghetto riot, by violence.
Three levels of support may be distinguished: the authorities, the regime (or constitutional order), and the political community. Support for each object may vary independently, but strong associative relationships normally involve a "spillover" effect, by which support for one object is transferred to the others. Political opposition is characterized f as "negative support." Persistence depends on "the maintenance of a minimum level of attachment for each of the three identified political objects- Where the input of support falls below this minimum, the persistence of any kind of system will be endangered."103 "A system may seek to instill in its members a high level of diffuse support in order that regardless of what happens the members will continue to be bound to it by strong ties of loyalty and affection/' This form of support is independent of specific rewards and is normally the product of a political socialization stressing partriotism and loyalty to leaders, constitu-
tion, and country. "No system," Easton writes/ "could endure for very long if it did not seek to build up a reservoir of support."10'1
Diffuse support may provide elasticity, but under what conditions does such support "come to the rescue" of the system?105 In the long run, every system falls back on specific support, generated by "the satisfaction a member feels when he perceives his demands as having been met."108 Outputs represent system response to existing or anticipated demands and are distinguished from their consequences or outcomes. Authorities may attempt to change the environment or to modify the political system itself in seeking to fulfill demands. Alternatively, effective response may be bypassed in favor of symbolic outputs-such as empty rhetoric, promises, and flag-waving, or in the diversionary tactics of fear and scapegoatism. This might be in the creation of fear of an external threat or of internal subversion. Failing all else, authorities may fall back on the negative output of coercion to ensure system persistence and their continued power.
No political system can meet all of the demands of all of its members all of the time. The support by members serves as "credit" on which the system operates, but "if the authorities are unable or unwilling to meet the demands of the members in some determinable proportions," discontent would soon mount and system support, built up through previous outputs, would decline.
Demands, independent of their impact or support, may impose stress on the system in terms of sheer volume. It may be that there are simply too many demands, with a variety, content, and intensity which overwhelm the system in what Easton calls "input overload." No system has an infinite capacity to accept and process demands, but the threshold of capability varies with each kind of system, its structure and culture.'07
The capacity of a system to respond effectively to stress is derived from the central process of feedback, information about the state of the system and its environment, which is communicated back to the authorities, Feedback is critical to system persistence, for "only on the basis of knowledge about what has taken place or about the current state of affairs with respect to demand and support would the authorities be able to respond by adjusting, modifying, or correcting previous decisions, including the failure to make a decision."108 Effective feedback, with maximum accuracy and minimum delay, by

effective response. Output failure may threaten any system- "Even if the authorities do obtain accurate information, lack of will to use it, lack of resources to put it to use, inadequate wisdom and skills in doing so may all contribute as much to an inability to meet a decline in support as the absence of such information feedback itself."109
Easton provides a model of "a vast conversion process" in which "the inputs of demand and support are acted upon in such a way that it is possible for the system to persist and to produce outputs meeting the demands of at least some of the members and retaining the support of most."110 The strains and imbalances which result from rising demands and crumbling support are catalysts of system change.
Disturbances, both from the environment and from within the system itself, may impose stress on the political system, threatening its capacity to persist. The persistence of a given political system, Easton argues, requires the presence of certain essential variables-"the allocation of values for society and the relative frequency of compliance with them"111-which operate within a "normal range." If these variables are displaced beyond a critical range by stress, the system collapses. "Systems analysis directs our attention toward the processes that all types of political systems share and that make it possible for them to cope, however successfully, with stresses that threaten to destroy the capacity of a society to sustain any political system at all."112 It is by no means clear, however, whether such system change involves radical / alteration within a single, persisting system or whether it involves the creation of an entirely new political system. The fact is that for alt Easton's concern for systemic change, the processes of change-revolutionary or evolutionary-are never fully discussed.
Non-persistence, for Easton, "suggests the complete breakdown and evaporation of a political system."113 This may mean physical annihilation or disintegrative anarchy. The disappearance of political systems may be momentary-as a result of civil war, revolution, or military defeat. While Easton says that a political system may recover its integrity, the problem remains as to whether it is the same system. If the

political community, as defined by geographic population, remains the same, perhaps the radical change might be viewed as involving the system's persistence. The matter would not be so-simple in the case of disintegration or amalgamation of states/ as in the breakup of the Aus-tro-Hungarian Empire or of Pakistan or in the creation of Malaysia or Yugoslavia. Even less clear analytically is the situation posed by rival systems, as in South Vietnam, where two governments claim control over the "hearts and minds" of the people-one by day and one by night.
Persistence, in Easton's view, is more than self-maintenance, a concept "heavily charged with the idea of stability."114 Persistence demands resilience in the face of stress. If a system is to survive, it must have the capacity to cope effectively with disturbances, either from the environment or from within the system. The political system must be able either to manipulate its environment so as to relieve stress or have the capacity to make "substantial and significant changes" or even fundamental modifications of its "scope, membership, structure and processes, goals, or rules of behavior.""5 Thus, the system is homeo-static or self-regulating, "even to the point of self-transformation/'118 Perhaps, as Eugene Miller suggests, "the remarkable capacity to persist which Easton finds in political systems is due largely ... to his manner of defining persistence."117
A Comparative Critique
Systems analysis, in its close relationship with structural-functional analysis, is confronted by many of the same problems that plague func-tionalism. Easton's model, for all his attempts otherwise, involves what Herbert Spiro has called an "excessive preoccupation with stability."118 This need not necessarily be so- Morton Kaplan has argued that "if we can construct a theory for a system or type of system, as a system of equilibrium, we can then inquire how individual variations in the parameters will produce deviant or unstable behavior."118 The view of

change or conflict as devianf behavior, however usually involves a normative bias toward stability. This is revealed in the very question Easton regards as the most fundamental; how systems persist. Easton's concern with persistence and stress involves a remarkable insensitivity to values, to the purpose of politics in terms of who gets what. This lack of emphasis on distribution and goal attainment is reflected in the discussion of roles, where, as Oran*Young points out, "the flow of analysis is directed toward the contribution of various role patterns to the persistence of the system, rather than toward the contribution of the system to the well-being of the role holders."'20
In systems analysis, as in functional analysis, conflict is regarded as a source of stress, a threat to system persistence.. Stability becomes the highest value, the primary goal of system behavior, with political consensus as its base. Beyond the conservatism the model may suggest, serious analytical problems arise from the stability orientation. In emphasizing "the functions of social conflict," Lewis Coser argues that certain forms of conflict, rather than being necessarily dysfunctional. may make important and vital contributions to the maintenance of the whole system. In a series of propositions, distilled from the work of Georg Simmel, Coser holds that conflict serves to establish and reinforce the identity of groups within the system and that reciprocal antagonisms serve to maintain the total system by establishing a balance between the various groups and component parts of the system.121
However one may evaluate the utility of Easton's systems analysis, "the simple fact of the matter is that this outlook has become a part of modern political science."122 The concept of the political system is by no means .new. Thomas Hobbes, in 1651, had written in those terms. "Anyone who attempts to study politics scientifically," according to Herbert Spiro, "must at least implicitly think of politics as though it were functioning as some sort of system. That is, he must assume that more or less regular relationships can be discerned among various aspects of politics and between phenomena he describes as political and certain other phenomena not so described."123
What Easton has done is to make these relationships explicit and self-conscious. Easton provides a framework as a useful way of analyzing the political world and of ordering the diffuse data of political life. It is a "conceptual framework around which the more complex structure

Having analyzed separately a number of theoretical approaches, it is now possible to assess the general state of theory building in the study of comparative politics. A comparative examination of the various approaches reveals a surprising similarity in terms of stages of theoretical advance. Although certain approaches may reflect slightly more progress in some arenas, they often lag behind other approaches in quite different respects. No single approach therefore, possesses a marked advantage in the overall process of theory construction.
of a theory may possibly, in the slowness of time, be added."124 In his aspiration to general theory, however, Easton has constructed a model perhaps so ethereal that it is, lacking more explicit operationalization, unlikely to yield empirically testable hypotheses and theories. As a consequence, in contrast to the work of Gabriel Almond, it has had little direct influence on empirical research in comparative politics. The deliberate degree of abstraction frees the model from the specificity of any particular type of system and thereby facilitates broad comparison, but it does so at the expense of content.125 "The whole framework," writes Klonoski, "has a sense of remoteness and abstraction from the facts and values of politics." The gap between theory and reality is not effectively bridged in such a way as to explain why things happen as they do.126
The structural elements of the system are never explicitly articulated, and the "black box," representing the authority structures of government-the traditional object of closest analytical concern-remains shrouded in mystery. "While suggesting certain structural components of a political system as a whole (the political community, the regime and the authorities)," Easton does not provide the "concepts needed to analyze the concrete subsystems of a system."127
The systems approach has sensitized the political analyst to the complex interrelationships of political life with the whole social system of ^-which it is itself a part. It has drawn attention to political phenomena as constituting an interrelated system of behavior and, consequently, has brought a renewed emphasis on the analysis of the whole political system, as distinct from the study of its discrete parts or contributing elements. Systems analysis, as in the case of functionalism, is most immediately valuable, however, as a framework for classification and analysis of large and diffuse aggregates of data.'28 By providing explicit and standardized criteria by which political phenomena can be examined, genuine comparison becomes possible. Herein lies the enormous contribution of both Gabriel Almond and David Easton to the study of comparative politics. Whatever weaknesses their schemata may entail, they have lifted comparative politics from the intuitive and sui generis to a level of self-conscious theory and systematic analysis.

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