tics. This list, which contains the perennial issues as well as queries more recently developed, reHects the concern for the very core of political analysis. Confrontation concerning such central issues in fact documents the dynamism that infuses the contemporary study of comparative politics.
The Traditional Study of Comparative Politics
The patterns of the traditional study of comparative politics in American political science were established most firmly during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During^hese years, .political science developed an identity that resulted in its recognition as a legitimate and fruitful focus of inquiry- At the same time, the important' relationship that "political analysis maintained with the study of history,) philosophy, and law was appreciated and preserved. Traditional oei3m-parative political studies reflected a significant concern for both historical perspective and the norms of political behavior. A further contribution of the traditional approach was its role in educating large numbers of American citizens about their own political institutions. Finally, traditional comparative government produced a host of studies that carefully and minutely described political structures and institutions. These studies remain a valuable source of data for comparative political analysis.
Despite contributions such as these, other characteristics infused the traditional study of comparative politics, severely impeding the development of systematic comparative inquiry and comparative political explanation. This may be described in terms of six major characteristics that marked the traditional approach: configurative description, formal-legalism, parochialism, conservatism, nontheoretical emphases, and methodological insensitivity.1 These characteristics have strongly marked the study of politics in the past and they continue to persist today in varying form and degree.2

Traditional comparative politics emphasized detaileddescription of particular political systems or particular aspects of these systems. Such procedure was, in fact, not comparative politics at all, but was more accurately configurative government. The scholar drew configurations of governmental institutions, describing them in varying degrees of intricacy. Characteristic studies included discussions and checklists of important names, dates, relevant historical events, sections of legal and constitutional documents, and committee and cabinet organization.
Most ordinarily, one scholar would present configurative descriptions of four or five European governments within one volume, each described according to its peculiar genius. Following World War II, a trend was established in which different scholars would describe different governments, and these would then be bound together in one volume and presented as a textbook in comparative government. Occasionally, introductions, essays, or monographs would appear, attempting to compare selected aspects of these configurations. Thus. in the introduction of his widely read text. Henry Russell Spencer wrote about the "far-reaching contrasts between Westminster and Paris as to the relation of voters and ministers to elective parliament; between the constitutional kingship that is an honorific badge worn by Victor Emmanuel III of Italy, and that which is a tool deftly wielded by Gustav of Sweden;
between Supreme Courts in countries which do and countries which do not possess a strong tradition of constitutional law and custom, which continues and grows and binds while parliamentary measures come and go."3 At the most, therefore, the traditional study of comparative politics involved comparative description. Most studies, however, concentrated upon configurative descriptions of governments, one by one. Very little is comparative about this kind of exercise-4
Formal- Legalism For years, the study of comparative politics reflected a preoccupation with formal structures and legal strictures. Emphasis was placed upon the organized and evident institutions of government, and studies concentrated almost exclusively upon constitutions. cabinets, parliaments!, courts, and bureaucracies.
The study of political science as a separate discipline-from which comparative politics developed as a sub-field-evolved out of the study of public law and institutional history.5 The title of one mid-nineteenth century government textbook reveals the strength of the formal-legal scholarly tradition: The Citizen 's Manual of Government and Law: Comprising fhe Elementary Principles of Civil Government; A Practical View of the State Governments, and of the Government of the United States; A Digest of Common and Statutory Law, and of the Law of Nations; and A Summary of Parliamentary Rules for the Practice of Deliberative Assemblies.^ Courses were frequently in the format of comparative constitutions of the world. In the mid-1920s, the political science department at the University of Michigan offered a course entitled "Charter and Ordinance Drafting." During this same period, Columbia University taught courses under the headings "Statutes" and "Problems of the Law of Taxation."
One of the earliest comprehensive American attempts to prepare a text in comparative politics was Woodrow Wilson's The Slate, first published in 1889.7 This 686 page study contained a 36 column index that devoted 26 lines to "constitution," 25 lines to "Senate," 23 lines to "law," 19 lines to "legislation," and 12 lines to "township." There was no reference to such concepts as "power," "interest," and "group." One line was devoted to "authority" and "competition," and two lines each to "revolution" and "slavery."
A 1927 Round Table Conference of the American Political Science Association that met to discuss the field of comparative government strongly endorsed the formal-legal perspective. As one participant pointed out, comparative politics should be particularly concerned with "the problems of federalism, judicial procedure, parliamentary practice, administration, and local government." He concluded by stating that "the comparative constitutional law of Anglo-American countries is a most satisfactory field because our law libraries offer unusual facilities."8 This deep-seated formal-legal tradition which stresses documents rather than political activities and the formal institution rather
'As late as 1914. only ,38 of some 300 American colleges and universities had distinct departments of political science. See Anna Haddow, political Science in American Colleges and Universities. 1636-1900 (New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1939), p. 263.
"Andrew W. Young, The Cifiien s Manual of Government and Law, rev. ed. (New York:
H. Dayton, 1858).
Woodrow Wilson, The State: Elements of Historical and Practical Potilics (Boston: D.C. Heath. 1889).
""Reports of Round Table Conferences: Comparative Government," Thf American Political Science Review 21 (May 1927):393.

than the informal processes of competition is still evident in many contemporary studies.
Parochialism Comparative political analysis in the past focused quite exclusively upon European government. But even within the study of comparative European politics, the scope was narrowed to consider again and again the same four societies: Great Britain, France, Germany, and Russia. The tenacity of this pattern is illustrated by the fact that eight different comparative texts devoted exclusively to this popular foursome consider these societies one by one in the identical country by country order.9 Various reasons have been proposed for this constricted emphasis. John Burgess wrote at the turn of the century that Great Britain, the United States, Germany, and France were "the most important states of the world."10 One set of authors, who also included Italy in their study, attempted to explain their five country choices as follows:
"The omission of materials relating to the other governments of Europe was due entirely to the lack of space and a desire to concentrate on the countries commonly included in college and university courses."" In a much more recent volume, the authors stress the "big four" which they "deem most significant to Americans both as factors in international politics and as political laboratories."12 Other reasons for this scholarly ethnocentricity derive from the knowledge gap caused by the inaccessibility of data and the inconvenience of research in much of the world. Since most non-Western societies apparently lacked formal governmental structures, many felt that little of substance was there to study anyway. Thus, one pioneering political analyst could write in 1900 that Asian nations "have created no real states."13

Concentration upon the more "advanced," "democratic,"' and "civilized" political systems carried a significant normative impact as well. If comparative methods were at all introduced, American and British political structures were elevated as the models. Other political systems tended to be presented as deviations from these standard cases and were ^ thus often labelled as exotic or alien. Most discussion of African, Asian, and Middle Eastern governments was left to archaeologists/ orientalists, missionaries, diplomats, and itinerant adventurers- The impact of this - neglect by social scientists is still seen in the absence both of incisive studies of numerous non-Western societies as well as of cross-societal studies that are able to draw deeply upon the Afro-Asian experience for purposes of comparative analysis.
Conservatism In the past, the study of comparative government tended to stress the permanent and the unchanging. Political institutions were examined in terms of an evolutionary development which found fulfillment in the immediate present- But while these institutions had a past, they apparently had no future. The study of British politics, for example, was reduced to a description of the evolution of institutions beginning with the Magna Carta. This historical process traced the unfolding of the unique and enduring in British political experience. Hil! and Stoke wrote in the preface of their volume that they placed emphasis "on the more basic and permanent phases of the European political systems-"1"1 Scholars consciously stressed the changeless quali-1 ties of political institutions and such phrases as "time-honored," "immutable," and "eternal" principles of government were sprinkled throughout the literature. The various texts reflected a deep feeling for tradition, precedent, order, stability, and conserving evolution.
This insensitivity to political modernization and transforming change was in large part due to the crucial period that political science spent in incubation with precedent-sensitive law and past-oriented history. In a world where the processes of political development were perceived as having "remained throughout clear and almost free from considerable irregularities" and in which "the lines of advance are seen to be singu-larly straight,"15 it is not surprising that there was little concern for or study of political dynamism.
For many years. Western scholars and statesmen alike assumed that all political systems were inexorably and inevitably evolving in the

direction of liberal democracy. In such a climate, democracy and stability were inextricably intertwined in the minds of men. Alexis de Toque-vine wrote, for example, that individuals living in democratic communities "are forever varying, altering, and restoring secondary matters; but they carefully abstain from touching what is fundamental."18
NontheoreHcal Emphases The concern for rigorous and systematic em-! pineal theory building wasToreignto most traditional scholars ofcorn^... paratrve politicsTVirtually no attempt was made tq_rormulate lightly o-, organized ancTtestable generalizations relating to political processes. Although classic political tKFnkers such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Montesquieu/ and Madison introduced numerous perceptive and incisive general insights into political study, they were not primarily concerned with operationalizing concepts and building scientifically rigorous theory. The great nineteenth century political sociologists, including Weber, Mosca, and Pareto, were somewhat more interested in scientific theory building. Within the early modern political science discipline, however, there was little concern for generating empirical theory.
The traditional emphasis was placed heavily upon normative theorizing, a process that had deep roots in the history of American political science. Indeed, the study of politics was first smuggled into the curriculum of American colleges and universities under the cloak of such subjects as moral philosophy and ethics. William Patey. whose classic study had a profound impact upon American political science in its formative years, wrote: "Moral Philosophy, Morality, Ethics, Casuistry, Natural Law, mean all the same thing: namely, that science which teaches men their duty and the reasons of if. "1T
By the turn of the twentieth century, the emphasis had come to focus on "the good citizen." Knowledge of the duties and responsibilities of citizenship and a deepening preoccupation with political philosophy became the major concerns of political science. The former emphasis has survived until contemporary times in the curriculum of many of the nation's secondary schools, while the latter continues as an important branch of political study in American universities and graduate schools. The concern with normative political theory, or political philosophy, therefore, traditionally dominated the discipline in a manner that tended to discourage the appearance of empirical theory. Subjects such

as moral philosophy, ethics, and jurisprudence were considered and explicitly termed "science/'18
A certain traditiona] bias has been formed against a science of politics since it was (and still is in many circles) argued that applying rigorous theoretical investigation in this area was impossible. The emphasis was placed upon the unique, variable, and unpredictable nature of political phenomena. Although nineteenth century thinkers sometimes termed politics a science, they tended to define the latter in broad and varying ways. Thus, Sir Frederick Pollock argued at the turn of the century that "there is a science of politics in the same sense, and to the same, or about the same, extent, as there is a science of morals."19
Methodological /nsensifiuify The field of comparative politics was from the beginning limited in the methodological and research procedures that its practitioners could utilize. Other than the classic schemes introduced by scholars such as John Stuart Mill, Auguste Comte, and Herbert Spencer, little was available in the character of refined and systematic comparative methodology.20 Even these classic presentations of research logic, however, were seldom utilized by political scientists. Techniques for selecting, collecting, and ordering data were undeveloped and un systematic. Dominant methods consisted of irregular observation and secondary source examination. These kinds of procedures were buttressed and reinforced by personal intuition, impression, and insight, the value of which varied greatly from scholar to scholar. An early president of the American Political Science Association once stated that "politics is an observational, and not an experimental science."2'
Sophisticated and systematic methodology was by and large not an area of basic concern to traditional comparative government scholars. The descriptive and formal-legal study of institutions did not demand deep behavioral and scientific research techniques. The gathering and perusal of documents and the intellectual interpretation of the legal intricacies of formal government were considered relevant procedures to the tasks at hand. Not surprisingly, therefore, as late as 1933 only one American university offered a thorough course in the methods of politi-

cal research.22 More surprisingly, a 1952 analysis of 797 research projects underway in 61 different graduate departments of political science indicated that at most 15 of these studies were at all concerned with methodology and/or the philosophy of science.23
These six characteristics have been presented as the predominant features that have marked the traditional study of comparative politics. Their presence and importance have varied from study to study as works occasionally appeared that were not so parochial or descriptive or static. Indeed, few studies exhibited all six characteristics in an unadulterated and unequivocal manner. However, these were the primary patterns, and their presence is stilt very much in evidence in current comparative political analysis. The interesting question concerns how these characteristics were able to dominate the field for so long and why they continue to persist and to exhibit such lasting endurance.
Much of the reason resides in the manner in which alt six patterns interlock and intertwine. An emphasis on one tends to develop and reinforce an emphasis on another. Parochialism, for example, increases the stress placed upon configurative description and formal-legalism. An interest in political systems in genera! involves increased contexts of analysis, inviting more comparison and less configuration. An acquaintance with less developed and non-Western societies indicates very soon the futility of understanding politics primarily in terms of laws and formal rules. Parochialism also lends support to the static emphasis. A more serious concern with those societies that reflect the widest gaps between "tradition" and "modernity" calls attention to the critical problems of social change and political development. In its limited analytical contexts, parochialism also does little to suggest comparative theory building and it fails to stimulate thought towards the development of fundamentally new research techniques- Pronounced ethnocentric political analysis has the further effect of indiscriminately portraying one's own political system as the ideal system. In this kind of situation, normative theory clearly assumes more importance than empirical theory.
Descriptive and formal-legal emphases in turn encourage parochialism. The minute description of formal institutions does not lend itself to the study of non-Western politics, nor do descriptive and formal approaches do much to recommend the significance of the fundamental processes of political change. Thus, these traditional characteristics sup-

port one another through a persisting pattern of reciprocal reinforcement. This explains why leading scholars as late as 1944 could refer to comparative government "as a discipline in a status of suspended animation."24
The Transforming Study of Comparative Politics
The 1950 Hawley-Dexter study of political science research underway in American universities tallied only 7 out of 797 projects that could be clearly and definitely considered in the area of comparative politics. The entire article devoted but four sentences to comparative politics and concluded: "At best, emphasis on the field is slight."25 Less than a decade and a half later, Somit and Tanenhaus found the profession designated comparative politics as the field in which the most significant work was being done.28 The first issue of the new journal Comparative Politics, published in 1968, described the field as an "exploding culture" and in the same issue one theoretician referred to the "continuing fermentation process" of the "new comparative politics."27
This changing emphasis is documented in more detail in figure 1, which indicates the twentieth century development of comparative politics courses in ten leading American universities. In 1925, approximately one of ten undergraduate political science offerings was in the comparative area; in 1945, the proportion had come to be nearly one in five; and in 1965, the proportion was rapidly approaching one in three.28
An early reaction to the traditional study of comparative politics began to develop in the 1920s, but not until the mid-1950s did significant and systematic new trends began to appear. The formation and

crystallization of these trends developed as a direct reaction to the characteristics that marked traditional comparative politics. As particular aspects of traditional comparative study were deeply attacked, the impact was felt throughout the network of mutually reinforcing emphases and methods. The behavioral revolution that occurred during this period assisted in undercutting former approaches and in unravelling the web or past procedures.
Within the social sciences in general, dissatisfaction with approaches that have stressed only configurative description has been increasing. Scholars have become preoccupied with "how" and "why" questions and are less prone to rest content with the "what" inquiry. Methods and modes of explanation have received growing attention in each of the major fields generally included under the term political science.29 Although describing political configurations is an essential part of scientific political analysis, it represents only one important step in the process of theory building. It is increasingly recognized that description must be utilized to promote explanation and that configurative exercises must become an integrated part of comparative analysis. Much of the reason for the demise of the purely descriptive emphasis resides in the close relationship that existed between this focus and the prevalence of formal-legalism.30
The roots of reaction to formal-legalism in American political science can be traced back to the 1920s and 1930s and to the pioneering writings of scholars such as George E. G. Catlin, Charles E. Merriam, and Harold Lasswell.3' These political scientists made similar pleas in the sense that they all cautioned against formal-legal-institutional study and called instead for the comparative analysis of power and control relationships. Not until the 1950s and 1960s, however, was the traditional emphasis upon formal-legalism replaced by a series of systematic new approaches/ all of which purported to confront and explain the fundamental patterns of political behavior. A major reason for the steady decline of formal-legal study resided in the continuing discovery and increasing knowledge of political systems where formal-legal structures were obviously only of peripheral importance.

The mid-twentieth century witnessed the development in the United
States of a deep and real interest in African, Asian. Middle Eastern, and Latin American political processes. The era of colonialism had been shattered; the United Stales had established firm political and economic commitments throughout the world; sharp competition developed between rival ideologies in the struggle over the non-Western areas of the world; international and interregional organizations of varying import and impact were born; and spectacular technological advances in the fields of transportation and communications increased contact between and among all societies.
At the same time, area study programs began to appear within American universities, and students increasingly began to study the history, language, culture, and politics of societies that had been formerly considered exotic.32 Private and public scholarship funds were made available to students and scholars interested in the sociopolitical processes of Afro-Asian and Latin American societies. Supported by a background in social science and methodology and armed with linguistic tools such as Arabic, Hindi, Swahili. Persian and Japanese, these scholars have rapidly increased the contexts necessary to successful comparative study. Table 1 reveals the tremendous growth of non-Western and Latin-American oriented courses in the political science curricula of ten major universities.
In 1925, only one course in non-Western politics was offered in all of the ten institutions of higher learning studied. This was Political Science 135 taught at the University of California and entitled "Political Development of China." Four decades later, these universities accounted for 65 different courses in non-Western and Latin-American political systems. Today, approximately every other course offered in the field of comparative politics concerns Third World systems. Many decades ago, George Catlin warned that "political studies will not be advanced by a political science of the arm-chair."33 What Karl Loewen-stein pointed out a bit prematurely in 1944 can now be reiterated more appropriately: "Supercilious aloofness from other peoples' political institutions-another facet of intellectual isolationism-has definitely come to an end."34

In the 1950s, political scholars began to focus seriously and systematically upon the problems of political development and social change. Words such as "modernization," "change," "development," "revolution," "reform," "transformation," and "process" began to appear everywhere in the literature. Leading comparative specialists immediately confronted these issues and their analyses remain among the most incisive contributions to the study of political change. Scholars such as Samuel P. Huntington. Gabriel Almond, Fred W. Riggs, David E. Apter, Manfred Halpern, Lucian W. Pye, Dankwart A. Rustow and Leonard Binder continue to move the study of comparative politics in a direction that will enable it to address successfully the challenge of modernization- Not accidentally, most of these theoreticians are fundamentally concerned with non-Western societies- A deep knowledge of such societies directly reflected the existence of rapid change, great development gaps, and concomitant tension, frustration, conflict, and violence. This, in turn, occasioned a reexamination of Western political patterns in general and American politics in particular.35 The issue of political development is presented as holding universal import.
Finally, contemporary comparative politics is marked by a deepening concern for theoretical and methodological considerations. Here the thorny issue of behavioralism becomes acutely relevant. Voices for and against a changing political science have used this term to buttress their respective stances and to vindicate their obvious dogmatism. The "be-havioralists" too often have considered themselves scientific sages because of their facility in the arts of statistics and neology, while the "anti-behavioralists" have tended to sneer defensively at anything and everything that suggests scientific method and theory building. Few have bothered to define "behavioralism" cautiously, concisely, and clearly.
Behavwralism
, Behavioralism can be defined as the systematic search for political patterns through the formulation of empirical theory and the technical analysis and verification thereof. Behavioralism involves two basic emphases: "the formulation of concepts, hypotheses, and explanations in systematic terms" and "empirical methods of research."36 The essence

of a behavioral science is that "all hypotheses be experimentally confirmed by reference to publicly observable changes in behavior."37
According to David Easton, the behavioral movement within the discipline of political science has involved special concern for the following eight characteristics: regularities, verification, techniques, quantification/ values/ systematization, pure science, and integration.38 There are regularities in political behavior that can be stated and tested. The discovery and validation of such uniformities can be furthered and ascertained by rigorous techniques involving the selection, collection, and ordering of data. This task can in turn be facilitated by the introduction of precision through measurement and quantification. Behavioral-ism does not discard values, but rather stresses the need to distinguish j carefully and analytically between fact and value.39 Systematization ' involves a recognition of the need to relate empirical research to theory building and to stress the symbiotic relationship between theory and data. The emphasis called "pure science" refers to the logical precedence of theory and explanation to the specific activities of political engineering. Finally, behavioralism often calls for the utilization of cross-disciplinary approaches, methods and findings.
Various scholars have stressed one or another of these characteristics of behavioralism- Indeed, intra behavioral divisions have increasingly resulted in allegations and accusations reflected in terms such as "non-behavioral," "prebehavioral/' "pseudo behavioral/' and "postbehav-ioral." Perhaps the major fissure in past dialogue among behavioralists has been between'those seeking to confine the meaning of behavioralism to the sophisticated employment of quantitative techniques and i precision of measurement and those identifying behavioralism more 1 with the scientific methodology of conceptual rigor, hypothesis formu- i lation, and theory building. Although controversies such as these have ', often generated a narrow academic dogmatism, they have also con- '
tributed to a continuing evaluation and reassessment of current trends in political analysis.
The behavioral approach as equated with technique has been challenged fundamentally by what is increasingly referred to as the "post-behavioral revolution." David Easton's "Credo of Behavioralism" is being replaced by what he terms a "Credo of Relevance."40 The post-behavioral revolution does not displace behavioralism in its broader

dimension but sensitizes the political scientist to the role of values and the importance of policy considerations. This trend will play an important role in charting the future directions into which the study of comparative politics will move.
The major dissatisfaction with behavioral emphasis has been the preoccupation with technique rather than substance, contemplative theorizing rather than policy relevant theory, and neutral academic conservatism rather than progressive social transformation. The marked tendency to theorize about theory (metatheory) and to amass and study only that data conducive to exact measurement has occurred in a world increasingly convulsed by division, discrimination, poverty, and violence. In his 1969 presidential address to the American Political Science Association, David Easton stated that "the search for an answer as to how we as political scientists have proved so disappointingly ineffectual in anticipating the world of the 1960s has contributed significantly to the birth of the postbehavioral revolution." He pointed out that "mankind today is working under the pressure of time. Time is no longer on our side."41 Sheldon Wolin argues that in a world that "shows increasing signs of coming apart . . . official political science exudes a complacency which almost beggars description."42 Hans J. Morgenthau has spoken about the tendency of contemporary political scientists "to retreat from the burning political problems of the day into a kind or methodological or factual irrelevance." He argues that the "innocuous" political scientists of the past "created a respectable methodological wall between themselves and the political problems of the day and were exactly those who were irrelevant then and who are forgotten today."43 August Heckscher has written that "research which disavows any responsibility except that of being objective and non-utilitarian may well qualify as 'pure.' But it is the kind of purity which a society-particularly a society in an age of change-can overvalue."44
In a world caught in the midst of fundamental change, problem selection and problem solution assume increasing importance- There is an embryonic but marked trend away from the speculative/contemplative and a movement towards the meaningful application of social and political knowledge. The methodology of behavioral science is increasingly being related directly to the sociopolitical issues of the day. Thus, David Easton foresees a "politicization of the profession," while Harold

Lasswell calls for a "problem-solving attack on political science."'15 Yet/ despite the fact that the priorities and perspectives of the discipline are being increasingly reassessed as technique is measured against substantive contribution, there is little doubt that the behavioral concern for methodological rigor will long remain. The question is one of emphasis and purpose, and the movement is one that stresses the confluence of scientific methodology and problem solution. In the mainstream of this postbehavioral movement are a number of related tendencies that promise to characterize the future study of comparative politics. There are four broad categories of trends.
Interdisciplinary Cooperation and Communication
With the drive for more problem-centered inquiry, the often artificial and arbitrary lines which divide the social sciences become increasingly irrelevant and indefensible. Many of the important strides already made in the recent resurgence in the comparative study of politics owe a great deal to methods and approaches borrowed from sociology. Examples include structural-functional analysis, as well as refined group, class, and elite analysis. Future developments indicate an intellectual convergence of political science with economics, anthropology, and social psychology. In the search for truly comparative tools for the analysis of social and political behavior, for example, a growing number of political scientists have turned to economic rationality models and to supply and demand laws applied to collective goods. Others are moving in the direction of political anthropology as they seek to ferret out and compare the informal patterns of interpersonal power and authority relationships. The findings of social psychology are increasingly drawn upon by scholars seeking to apply learning theory to the study of political socialization. These represent only a few examples of an accelerating drive that is beginning gradually to break down the barriers that divide the social sciences. Departments, divisions, and institutes of social science are increasingly becoming realities. The methodologies, theoretical frameworks, and conceptual apparatus pertinent to comparative analysis are neither monopolized by nor concentrated within the discipline of political science. In this spirit leading scholars such as David Singer and David Easton have already called for the establishment of a "Federation of Social Scientists."46
These interdisciplinary trends, however, may carry far beyond inter-social scientific inquiry. The study of comparative political patterns, for
"Easton. "The New Revolution," p. 1060; and Harold Lasswell, 'The Future of the Comparative Method," Comparative Politics 1 (October 1968):11. "Easton, "The New Revolution," pp. 1060-61.

example, may gain profoundly from advances made in the biological sciences. The developing field of ethology or social biology, which concerns the analysis of animal behavior and its patterns of evolution, has already suggested numerous provocative propositions that may go far to explain the behavior of the political animal. The crucial comparative problems of conflict and cooperation closely parallel the ethologists' concern for the processes of aggression and sociability. Scholars such as Konrad Lorenz and John N. Bleibtreu provide particularly stimulating studies of animal behavioral patterns that are often explicitly related to human political behavior. Comparative political analysts are only now beginning to open their lines of communication in these less orthodox directions.47
Intersociefal Cooperation and Comprehension Comparative political study has been marked by a continually widening universe of analysis that began with the narrow plethora of studies focusing almost exclusively upon Euro-American societies. This was followed by country monographs and area studies. Political analyses of particular societies that can be utilized as case studies for purposes of comparative analysis and theory building are in many cases nonexistent. Country monographs that are conceptually sound, theoretically rigorous, and problem oriented are extremely rare. Area studies which further intraregional, cross-societal investigation are only in the infancy of their development. By providing multicontextual laboratories, such studies often encourage the comparative analysis necessary to the generation of meaningful hypotheses. Future problem-oriented comparative study will draw upon the experiences of societies and cultures anywhere and everywhere in the world. Subcultures and intrasocietal structures and institutions will also serve as units for comparative study. Country and area studies will no doubt continue to develop and increase along with what Dankwart Rustow calls "cross-regional comparison."48
The tremendous task of confronting the multitude of varied laborato-

ries of comparative political experience will increasingly be shared by social scientists representing nations throughout the world. African, Asian, and Latin American scholars, for example, have begun to team with Europeans and Americans for the study of political processes in the societies under investigation. Scholars native to the particular society o under study carry social and cultural advantages that enable them to ) analyze the system from within. The outside scholars bring a differing;
and more detached perspective to bear upon that same political system. | Cooperative efforts by such multinational research teams should im-1 prove immeasurably our understanding of comparative political processes. Scattered but serious efforts in this direction have already begun to bear fruit,
Special note might be made of the growing proclivity to treat the study of American politics as an integral part of the study of comparative politics. Surely, many of the intradisciplinary divisions are as artifi-. cial and sterile as some of the interdisciplinary distinctions referred to above. Problems such as political development, poverty, violence, and discrimination are as much a challenge to the United States as to any other society. The experiences and patterns that mark the most elaborately studied society in the world are increasingly becoming an essential part of comparative political investigation. There is no reason why an "American specialist" should not be a "comparative specialist" and vice-versa. The political and personal patterns that mark American subcultures, for example, may very well more closely approximate those of certain Afro-Asian societies than those of white middle class America.49 This kind of comparative analysis promises to generate provocative and policy relevant hypotheses.
Academic Cooperation and Communication
Partially because of the growing demand upon the scholar of comparative politics to be a theoretician, historian, statistician, mathematician, sociologist, psychologist, linguist, and country/area specialist, and partially because of the deep need for more imaginative analyses and prognoses, increasing communication and continuing scholarly dialogue must inevitably develop. The establishment of institutes, seminars, workshops, and conferences on a more regular basis can, and in some cases has already begun to, mean a cooperative cross-fertilization of ideas. Harold Lasswell, for example, has recently called for "a nationwide and worldwide network of counterpart seminars-"50 Such semi-

nars will contribute to the presentation, sharing, probing, and generation of ideas. A system of in-depth dialogue and confrontation may someday absorb students, researchers, and faculty of varied disciplines and backgrounds in a systematic effort to improve our understanding of comparative political systems.
Inlerprocedural Experimentation and Adaptation
The drive to refine the experimental, statistical, and mathematical techniques which were emphasized and developed during the behavioral period will continue. New quantitative procedures and measurement devices will be constantly generated to seek precision whenever and wherever possible. Social science research and experimental specialists will increasingly serve as indispensable technicians for the translation, measurement, and testing of hypotheses. The continuing advance of technology will build deeper sophistication into methods of gathering, cataloguing, storing, retrieving, and comparing data. In the search for more accurate data, methodology and techniques are beginning to be borrowed from sciences such as biology and physiology.
At the heart of the behavioral movement and the continuing transformation of the study of comparative politics has been a growing concern for theory. Much of the controversy that swirls about behavioralism and postbehavioralism concerns the role of problems, approaches, tax-onomies, and data in the theory building process. The trend to theory means many things to many people, and because of this it demands explicit examination and clarification-
The Theoretical Mold
The spirit of generalization should dominate a university .... During the school period the student has been mentally bending over a desk;
at the university he should stand up and look around.... The function of the university is to enable you to shed details in favor of principles. Alfred North Whitehead51
During a plane trip to three societies outside of the United States, an American traveler who is interested in the question of whether there is a relationship between a society's legislative system, literacy rate, and form of government first visits country x which he knows is a Middle Eastern monarchy. During his stay there, the visitor notes an absence of any legislature and the presence of a high illiteracy rate. He then travels to country y which is a Southeast Asian monarchy where he again observes the absence of legislative politics and the existence of a

high rate of illiteracy. He next travels to country z in Africa about which he has no political knowledge. Here, the traveler notes the absence of any legislature along with high illiteracy- He concludes that this country is a monarchy.
In this situation, the traveler engaged in both inductive and deductive mental processes. In his first two experiences, the absence of a legislature and the existence of a high rate of illiteracy went together with a monarchical form of government. This was the case in the first country and it was confirmed in the second society. Although this is an obviously weak basis for conclusion, it is still enough to make a crude 9
__ --
induction, i.e., to generalize from particular facts. The observer expected to find a monarchy if illiteracy prevailed and legislatures were nonexistent. From this, the generalization was formulated that all countries lacking legislatures and possessing high rates of illiteracy are monarchies- Upon visiting another highly illiterate and "legislatureless" society, he concluded: All "legislatureless" and highly illiterate societies are monarchies; this society is "legislatureless" and highly illiterate; therefore, this society is a monarchy. This is a logical case of deduction, i.e., formulating a specific conclusion on the basis of a general assumption. In this described reasoning process, a generalization was first established by induction and upon this generalization was founded a deduction.
The above example represents a step-by-step replication of the method of scientific investigation presented by the great nineteenth century scientist, Thomas H. Huxley.52 Huxley once defined science as "trained and organized common sense" and told his readers that theory building is something you engage in "every day and every hour of your lives."53 Albert Einstein has written that "the whole of science is nothing more than a refinement of everyday thinking."54 The focus upon theory and the scientific method represents the heart of the behav- | ioral and postbehavioral movements in contemporary political science, j Nevertheless, the concept theory remains surrounded by tremendous . confusion.. and many students of comparative politics still recoil men- :
tally when confronted with the subject. There are, of course, many reasons for this apprehensive attitude-
The concept theory has been treated in an offhand and rather cavalier manner even by leading scholars of political science. The concept has been left completely undefined;55 it has been defined indirectly;56 it

has been defined ambiguously;57 and it has been equated with other equally confusing terms such as model and method.58 The situation has ""7 been muddied considerably by the necessary consideration of several / additional ill-defined and ambiguously-presented concepts, all of which ' are crucially related to theory and the process of theory building. These concepts include approach, conceptual framework, definitional system, taxonomy, classificatory scheme, typology, model, generalization, hypothesis, law, and paradigm. Philosophers of science themselves have been unclear and inconsistent in their usage of such terms. Certainly no common, agreed-upon system of definitions exists that even begins to distinguish and relate a comprehensive list of these important concepts. The political scientists' usage of these terms is considerably more confused since their views are shaped by sporadic secondhand reliance upon different philosophers of science.59 A further cause of this confusion is the fact that a terminology generally agreed upon is as much the outcome of scientific progress as the precondition of it.
The difficulties have been compounded and continue to increase as scholars feel compelled to make perfunctory bows in the direction of these key concepts. Therefore, the literature is sprinkled with loosely presented terms that happen to be most crucial to the theorizing process. There are, for example, theoretical and conceptual approaches, theoretical and conceptual frameworks, theoretical and conceptual systems, theoretical and conceptual models, and theoretical and conceptual typologies. Approaches, taxonomies, typologies, and models are constantly presented and portrayed as theories. Taxonomies and typologies are sometimes treated as synonyms; other times they are sharply distinguished. This same kind of inconsistency marks the situation of model-paradigm and generalization-theory. Leading and theory conscious political scientists the caliber of David Easton, for example, have equated the term "conceptual framework" with "a body of theory." "a theoretical model," -and "a system of working hypotheses."60
The following discussion represents an attempt to define, distinguish, and relate explicitly those-concepts central to theory building in comparative political analysis. The uncertainty that surrounds these concepts is well recognized, but it is also relevant to note that serious

dispute exists about even more fundamental matters such as the very methods presented in philosophy of science.<" The "scientific method" itself is by no means something agreed upon and accepted.ez The reader should not be surprised, therefoie, if the definitions and distinctions presented herein do not always coincide with his own conceptions or those of a particular school of methodology. The definitions in the following list have been formulated in view of five major considerations: (1) general views on these concepts as expressed in the philosophy of science literature; (2) meanings of these terms as used in the natural and physical sciences; (3) importance of simplicity and conciseness; (4) need to relate these concepts one to another and then to the overall process of theory building; and (5) concern for the subject matter and problems of comparative politics.
Approach: A predisposition to adopt a particular conceptual framework and to explore certain types of hypotheses towards the generation of theory.
Conceptual Framework: A schema of explicitly defined and differentiated concepts necessary to the study of a particular subject.
Taxonomy: A subject divided into classes distinct from one another.
A taxonomy is also referred to as a classificalory scheme or classification system.
Typology: That kind of taxonomy in which dassificatory distinctions are graded or ordered.
Model: A theoretical and simplified representation of the real world.
Generalization: Statement of uniformities in the relations between two or more variables of well-defined classes.
Hypothesis: A generalization presented in tentative and conjectural terms.
Theory: A set of systematically related generalizations suggesting new observations for empirical testing.
Law: A hypothesis of universal form that has withstood intensive experimentation.
Paradigm: The worldview which legitimates the scientific community's consensus on what constitutes exemplary scientific research.

Approach and Theory One of the most important concepts to the systematic investigation of comparative politics is reflected in the term approach. Basically a very simple concept, the idea of approach has in many respects become one of the most often misunderstood and distorted. The major reason for the difficulty inheres in a persisting proclivity among scholars to label and present certain approaches as theories. Such terms as "group theory/' "functional theory," and ^systems theory," are prime examples of this confusion. These three, for example/ are approaches, and it is difficult to see how they can be termed theories since they are insufficiently articulated in terms of the systematic relationship of hypotheses.
An approach is a predisposition to adopt a particular conceptual framework and to explore certain types of hypotheses towards the generation of theory. At bottom/ an approach is the particular orientation that one adopts when addressing a subject or issue. It is the line of advance that a scholar takes in initiating his investigation. This orientating framework is of crucial import to the theorizing process since it determines what sets of concepts, questions/ perspectives, and procedures the researcher will adopt in pursuing his inquiry. The approach that one selects will decidedly shape the hypotheses that are generated and ultimately the theory that is formulated. An approach may be implicit or explicit; it may be crudely developed or highly refined; and it may be utilized either to describe or explain.
This volume is pre-eminently a critical survey of various theoretical approaches to the study of comparative politics. It is not a survey of theories. Rigorous, systematic, and explicit theories of politics are still in relatively embryonic stages of development. Approaches, however/ provide the frameworks within which theories are constructed. This aspect and function of an approach will be strongly emphasized in the following pages. The major concern herein is for developing approaches to theory. The relation of an approach to a theory is of vital importance to this study. Thus, we use the term theoretical approach.
Conceptual Frameworks A conceptual framework is here considered more the equivalent of a definitional schema than of some broader system of classification or theory.63 More accurately, it is a schema of explicitly defined and differentiated concepts that are necessary to the study of a selected subject. A conceptual framework provides a systematic arrangement of those conceptual tools that accompany a particular theoretical approach. It must not under any circumstances be considered

theory since it neither generalizes nor explains. A well-formulated and rigorously constructed conceptual framework, however, is an essential element in the theorizing process. If the basic concepts of an approach are ambiguous, then the resultant theory will also be ambiguous- A confusing/ unclear/ or contradictory conceptual schema signals confusion for any theoretical edifice that might rise around such a framework. For this reason, Arthur Stinchcombe writes that "social theorists should prefer to be wrong rather than misunderstood."8"
The process of conceptualization is a complex one since it is directly entwined with such theory relevant exercises as classification and generalization. Concepts themselves can be classified according to the level of abstraction or stage of generality at which they are located. Karl Popper, for example, distinguishes between universal and individual concepts. According to Popper/ terms such as "dictator," "planet," and "HzO" refer to universal concepts while "Napoleon," "the earth," and "the Atlantic" are corresponding individual concepts.85 A number of notable attempts have recently been made to confront this issue of generality with specific regard to comparative political and sociological study. One scholar writes about universal, general/ and configurative conceptualizations which in turn correspond to high, medium/ and low level categorizations.68
Another pair of theorists analyze the situation in terms of concepts dichotomously viewed as observables and constructs.67 Observable concepts are susceptible to direct sensory observation and exist at a relatively low level of generalization. Constructs are general abstractions of persons, places, or events. The process by which one moves from the observable level of conceptualization to the more abstract constructual level has been termed abduction.88 Observable or low level concepts are grounded more in the "real" world and tend to preserve the details and intricacies of the situation under investigation. The more abstract species of concept lends itself readily to generalization and "can transcend the limits of individual instances precisely because its terms are not completely dependent upon any one of these cases or

a sum of them for their meaning."69 Despite all this, both levels of conceptualization are crucial to theory construction. Also, a scholar's awareness of these kinds of conceptual distinctions is critical to successful theorizing.
One of the first requirements of scientific theory building is that the basic concepts be presented explicitly and clearly. Implicit conceptual frameworks invite imprecision and misunderstanding. This has been particularly so in comparative political analysis where the most vital concepts carry an extraordinary amount of definitional haze and ambiguity, Examples include terms such as "group/" "class/" "power," "authority," "structure," and "system." Despite this, scholars of comparative politics continue to leave crucial concepts undefined, and when they do indulge in definition they do so sporadically and unsystemati-cally- The general trend seems to be that only graduate students are expected to provide rigorous conceptual schemata which must necessarily preface their term papers and theses. The point is not to support exercises in verbal hair splitting and definition bickering, but rather to stress the important theoretical role of clear and consistent conceptual presentation. Carl G. Hempel argues that the first fundamental requirement for scientific theory building is "a clear specification of the basic concepts. .. ."70 One Nobel prize winner argues that all science "depends on its concepts. These are the ideas which receive names. They determine the questions one asks and so the answers one can get. They are more fundamental than the theories, which are stated in terms of them."71
Taxonomies, Typologies, and Models Taxonomies, typologies, and models contribute significantly to the theorizing process. Very often they are presented as theory, but like conceptual frameworks they are neither generalizing nor explanatory instruments. Richard Rudner summarizes this situation perfectly when he describes the activity of constructing taxonomies, typologies, and models as "theoretical work" but not "formulations of theory."72
A taxonomy (also referred to as a classificatory scheme or classification system) is a subject divided into classes distinct from one another.

In this kind of classification exercise, an object either falls into a defined class or it does not, depending upon whether or not it possesses the characteristics essential to inclusion in that class. Because of the shaded, graded, and changing nature of much of the subject matter central to sociopolitical affairs, however, classification is difficult. It is certainly often impossible to classify with any kind of precision. A typology carries more flexibility than a taxonomy since it permits ordered classifi-catory distinctions. Typologies introduce a more subtle and precise method of classification which is rendered especially so by the possibility for the introduction of quantitative techniques. Formulations that concentrate upon continua, axes, polarities, and serials are typologies, not taxonomies.73
A model is a theoretical and simplified representation of the real world.71 It is an isomorphic construction of reality or anticipated reality. A model, by itself, is not an explanatory device, but it does play an important and directly suggestive role in the formulation of theory. By its very nature it suggests relationships. Whereas taxonomies and typologies divide and order, models reconstruct. The jump from a model to a theory is often made so quickly that the model is in fact believed to be the theory. A model is disguised as a theory more often than any other concept. This confusion has been complicated by the recent popularity of the term parad'xgm-a concept often confused with both model and theory.
In ei general sense, the concept of paradigm is closely related to the idea of model since it is derived from the Greek term paradeigma meaning to set up as an example. For purposes of comparative political analysis/ however, paradigm will be defined in a sense relatively akin to the meaning introduced by Thomas Kuhn, whose work has had a decided impact upon theories of scientific development.75 The concept of paradigm refers to the fact that (1) the particular scientific community holds basic assumptions about what it is investigating; and (2) examples of recognized exemplary scientific research exist that are accounted for in terms of these assumptions. An individual who accepts this basic world view as well as the research that develops from these

assumptions is regarded as a bona fide member of the scientific community. A paradigm, then, is the worldview which legitimates the scientific community's consensus on what constitutes exemplary scientific research.76
Taxonomies, typologies, and models perform several positive functions in the theorizing process. They describe, order, clarify, stimulate, and compare. Typing and classifying, for example, are first methods of description. The systematic and ordered nature of such description makes it an especially valuable tool to theory building. Indeed, the ordering of data serves as a catalyst in the theorizing process because it clarifies what is usually very complex subject matter, and serves to stimulate hypotheses and generate theory. A tidy taxonomy or a refined model often reveals patterns and relations that were formerly concealed by the haphazard and jumbled arrangement of data. The very exercises of classifying, typing, and modeling also often suggest new connections and relations that can be framed as tentative generalizations. Finally, whether it is classes or types on the one hand or isomorphisms on the other, an element of implicit or explicit comparison is always involved. One class or type is, at least in some respects, compared to another class or type, and continual and reciprocal comparison is involved between models and the objects they seek to represent.
One of the major difficulties inherent in the intensive construction of taxonomies, typologies, and models involves a loss of scientific perspective. The development and refinement of these kinds of mental constructs becomes an end in itself. Taxonomies and models are developed, defended, discarded, redeveloped, and redefended in a ceaseless intellectual exercise. This kind of process can be quite fruitful if the theoreti-cian remembers exactly what he is doing and realizes exactly what are the intellectual contributions of the exercise- If, however, the theorist presents these exercises as theory, he may in fact be impeding the theorizing process. Not only does he twist and distort the meaning of theory, but he also invests a great deal of energy in projects not related to theory-building. This "taxonomizing" or "modelmania" results, therefore, in the proliferation of sterile constructs that rest outside the process of theory building.
Despite dangers such as these, taxonomies, typologies, and models represent important steps on the road to theory. "Scientific explanation requires the systematic ordering and classification of empirical data.""

The Essence of Theory
The analysis of comparative political theory requires that an early distinction be drawn between two types of theory, normative theory and empirical theory. Traditionally, the field of political theory within the discipline of political science concerned itself with the study of normative theory. The emphasis was placed upon norms, i.e., rules and standards, of political behavior. Investigation centered upon how man should or ought to act politically, and the history of the development of political values and goals dominated the study of political theory. Discussions concerning such fundamental values as justice, equality, freedom, and democracy have long existed at the core of normative political theory. This important area of analysis continues to contribute to political science and is now referred to as political philosophy as well as political theory. Empirical theory refers to a reliance upon experience, observation, and experiment. The basic concern is with actual and observable behavior rather than with proper or desirable behavior. Empirical theory involves the observation, generalization, and explanation of actual (empirical) behavior. In this study, theory always refers to empirical theory unless otherwise noted.78
A theory is a set of systematically related generalizations suggesting new observations for empirical testing. Thus defined, the concept "theory" contains three major elements: (1) theory always involves generalization, i.e., it includes statements that highlight uniformities between two or more variables; (2) theory suggests new observations, i.e., it draws relations that carry different explanations of empirical reality; and (3) theory is testable. The formulated generalizations must possess the capacity to be tested, i.e., to be falsified on the basis of evidence drawn from empirical examples. A theory is a general statement that systematically calls attention to regularities and patterns. Carl G. Hempel writes that besides a clear specification of the basic concepts, a scientific theory requires; (1) a set of general assumptions; (2) a connection between the theoretical statement and observable phenomena; and (3) "testability-in-principle" of the theory, i.e., the presence or absence of observable phenomena measured against the theory will provide confirming or discontinuing evidence concerning the theory.79
Various types of generalizations fall within our definition of theory. These range all the way from generalizations of probable applicability to generalizations of invariable applicability. One of the most lucid

classifications of generalizations has been provided by Eugene Meehan who distinguishes universal generalizations, probabilistic generalizations, and tendency statements. According to Meehan, a universal generalization is phrased in terms of "All A is B" or "If A then B." An example relevant to comparative political analysis and one that at the same time preserves some modicum of credibility would be: "All military coups that result in a change in political elites are planned and engineered by middle-ranking army officers."80 The probabilistic generalization is limited to those statements in which a particular percentage is an integral part of the generalization. An example would be:
"Eighty-five percent of military coups that result in a change in political elites are planned and engineered by middle-ranking army officers." Finally, an example of a tendency statement is as follows: "Military coups that result in a change in political elites tend to be planned and engineered by middle-ranking army officers." All of these classes of statements are theoretical but only universal and probabilistic generalizations can be termed strictly theory.81
One of the key components of a theory is that it must carry the capacity to be falsified. If empirical evidence exists that contradicts the theoretical statement, then the latter may be refuted. Usually, it is necessary that the contradicting evidence be reproducible or recurring in order to disconfirm the theory under question.82 It is impossible to confirm or prove a theory. This is why theory construction is a continu-ing and open-ended process. The distinguished physicist Richard Feyn-^man summarizes this important point concerning the essence of theory in the following terms:
There is always the possibility of proving any definite theory wrong;
but notice that we can never prove it right. Suppose that you invent a good guess, calculate the consequences, and discover every time that the consequences you have calculated agree with experiment. The theory is then right? No, it is simply not proved wrong. In the future you could compute a wider range of consequences, there could be a wider range of experiments, and you nught then discover that the theory is wrong. That is why laws like Newton's laws for the motion of planets last such a long time. He guessed the law of gravitation.

calculated all kinds of consequences for the system and so on, compared them with experiment-and it look several hundred years before the slight error of the motion of Mercury was observed. During all that time the theory had not been proved wrong, and could be taken temporarily to be right. But it could never be proved right, because tomorrow's experiment might succeed in proving wrong what you thought was right. We never are definitely right, we can only be sure we are wrong."
In the social sciences there is often a deceptive confidence in low level theoretical statements since they appear to resist falsification. This confidence is certainly premature for two basic reasons: (1) no theory is ever confirmed and all such statements require time to be tested; and (2) many theoretical statements are presented in forms that make falsification impossible. As such, they cannot be referred to as theory. The political science literature is laden with statements that are purported to be theory but are in fact so broad, indefinite, flexible, and ambiguous that they can indefinitely resist falsification. Feynman correctly points out that "you cannot prove a vague theory wrong-"84 And as a leading scholar of applied mathematics writes: "... a theory that is not rigid enough to be disproved is just a flabby bit of talk. A theory is scientific only if it can be disproved. But the moment you try to cover absolutely everything the chances are that you cover nothing."85
Tendency statements fall into this intellectual trap. It is extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to falsify such statements. For this reason, tendency statements cannot be accurately considered theory. They can, however, serve an important function in the theory building process since they can act as general orientation guides out of which theory can be fashioned. Tendency statements can be highly suggestive and intellectually provocative and, if refined, can often form the basis of theory. It is true that "a good tendency statement may be far more useful in the explanation of political phenomena than a precise statistical generalization that deals with trivia."86 And it is also true that a continual exercise in building, connecting, and refining these kinds of generalizations leads slowly in the direction of probabilistic and universal theory. The process is one.

The subject matter of comparative politics is such that theoreticians have not moved much beyond the generation of tendency statements and probabilistic generalizations. There has been an orderly retreat away from the drive for universal generalizations or high level theory and various scholars have coined various terms for the kind of theory they feel social scientists should develop. Thus, there has been a call for "singular generalizations," "narrow gauge theory," "middle range theory/' "partial theories," "piecemeal theoretical insights," and "modest general propositions.""7 The changing, uncertain nature of political processes has been one major reason for the difficulty in building high level theory. (It was Albert Einstein who once pointed out that politics is more difficult than physics.) Another problem is the difficulty of gathering relevant data and the further dilemma of measuring that data or the relations that link that data.
Thus, even probabilistic theory is difficult to develop in comparative politics. Only in cases of less complex empirical issues where it is easy to collect relevant data can one build low level probabilistic theory. It has been clearly and correctly pointed out that:
Probability can only be stated in numerical terms when the phenomena to which it relates can be measured additively. In political science, that class of measurable phenomena is quite limited and it is obvious that many significant events cannot be so measured, though they are worth explaining. We can produce precise statements about voting behavior, or population movements, or various phases of economic activity, but the range of phenomena is narrow and the boundaries of the phenomena are not easily defined.BB
Comparative political analysis, therefore, continues to oscillate between tendency statements and probabilistic generalizations. The drive to construct theory is confined largely to the area of relatively low level empiricalgeneralizations.
The Process of Theory Building
The actual example of theory building presented at the beginning of
this section represents a crude exercise reflecting the core of the overall theorizing process sometimes referred to as the scientific method. Scientific theory building involves the interrelated processes of problemation,
"The first two terms belong to David Easton. The others have been used by Robert Merlon, Charles P. Kindleberger. Arthur L Burns, and V. 0. Key respectively. "Meehan, The Theory and Mefhoa of Political Analysis, p. 114.

observation, generalization/ confirmation, and application.89 (See figure 2.) These overlapping steps or stages are herein analytically distinguished one from the other for purposes of more detailed analysis. Despite the constant movement back and forth between and among these various processes, they are presented in the order in which they most often and logically occur.
Problem selection is one of the most important, if least discussed, exercises in theory building. This involves the determination of issues to be theorized about and the construction of patterns of questions to be raised. It is, of course, necessary to theorize about something, to draw relations between certain variables, to explain certain phenomena. The importance of a theory about hair styles of world political leaders is highly questionable, no matter how rigorous and refined this theory may be. Similarly, a precise and well-formulated theory about electoral patterns in the Afro-Asian world may be of little value if the votes cast in these settings reflect nothing about the actual power and authority relations in this region. The business of problem selection is that part of the theoretical process often referred to as the "context of discovery." Norwood R. Hanson stresses the crucial nature of this context when he argues that "the ingenuity, tenacity, imagination and conceptual boldness which has marked physics since Galileo shows itself more clearly in hypothesis-catching than in the deductive elaboration of caught hypotheses.90 Barrington Moore writes that "techniques alone cannot define what is scientifically worth investigating/'91
The process of successful theory construction relies heavily upon such considerations as intuition, imagination, insight, guesses, and hunches. Although the social and political sciences tend to play down this aspect of scientific inquiry, the more exact sciences cannot seem to stress these elements enough. The important role of chance and the unconscious is also an oft discussed topic in the literature on scientific method and theory construction in the physical and biological sciences. ^ James B. Conant has written, for example, that "the great

working hypotheses in the past have often originated in the minds of the pioneers as a result of mental processes which can be best described bv such words as 'inspired guess/ 'intuitive hunch/ or 'brilliant Hash of imagination/"93 Sharp intuitive capacities are invaluable in the selection of key problem areas and in the generation of theory.
In social and political analysis no less than in physical inquiry the ability to make the right guesses about the right issues is a crucial consideration- At any point in the theorizing process intuition can serve as the triggering mechanism that uncovers important and previously hidden patterns. New hypotheses are often generated on the basis of sensitizing hunches. One of the important keys in developing comparative political analysis is for the rigorous logicians and methodological technicists to make room for this more artistic component of science. At the same time, intuitive insights acquire more meaning when they spring up within a well organized context of theory construction. Insights, no matter how profoupd, must be harnessed and ordered if they are to yield fruitful explanation.
Even more dramatically illustrative of this point is the role that chance plays in scientific investigation. Chance is a significant variable and deserves recognition but its positive effects occur most readily in the correct setting. One scientist writes that "probably the majority of discoveries in biology and medicine have been come upon unexpectedly, or at least had an element of chance in them, especially the most important and revolutionary ones."94 Two other scientists point out, however, that "chance favors the prepared mind. The great chance discoveries in science were made by people who distinguished them-Selves by other work as well. It is only the master of his subject who can turn to his advantage the irrational and the unsuspected."95 The theoretical processes of problemation and discovery, in short, require a climate of informed flexibility.
Theory building requires a special kind of imagination, sensitivity, and creativity. In a limited sense, this can be stimulated by such theoretical exercises as classifying, typing, and modeling- It can also be partially developed by a broad knowledge of and deep insight into world history.
"James Conant, Science and Common Sense (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1951), P. 48.
'"Beveridge, The Art of Scientific Investigation, p. 31. Perhaps no better example is provided of the role that chance and intuition play in scientific discovery than that of the process by which the genetic code was broken. This is vividly described in intensely personal terms in James D. Watson, The Double Helix: A Personal Account of the Discovery offhe Structure of DNA (New York: Atheneum, 1968).
"Gerald Hollon and Duane H. D. Roller, Foundations of Modem Physical Science (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. 1958), p. 249.

And finally, the kind of imagination required to sensitize one to fundamental problems can be encouraged by an ability to think in terms of continual comparison. In the end, however, there is as yet no definite information explaining why some scholars operate well and why others are uncomfortable and unproductive in the context of discovery.
Systematic observation is the next step of the theoretician. Included within this procedure are the development of conceptual frameworks, taxonomies, typologies, and models. Data is collected and classified in accord with "the scientific activity of description." 9a As there can be no explanation without description, this procedure assumes great importance. Even areas in the physical sciences including certain branches of biology are still primarily involved in the observation and classification stages of theory building. Careful and patient observation provides the basis for generalization which in turn yields explanation and understanding. When observation suggests certain uniformities and regularities, one may formulate an hypothesis or tentative generalization. This generalization is then subjected to continual testing by recourse to renewed and expanded observational procedures. No theory is ever finally and irrevocably confirmed, but the longer one survives rigorous testing the more powerful it becomes as an explanatory device.
Embedded within this brief discussion is implicit reference to a reciprocal inductive-deductive interaction. The contention that theory is essentially a deductive operation simplifies and distorts the process considerably. The idea that generalizations are somehow spun deduc-tively and then tested misrepresents a situation which "is much more fluid than this and undoubtedly always involves an inductive effort, r7 Theories are formulated on the basis of observation, experience, and evidence. Often generalizations thus formed become the basis for deduced conclusions. There is a constant movement back and forth between research and hypothesis, observation and generalization, fact and theory. Hempel points out that the two processes are "inseparably linked," and Eulau stresses their "mutual interdependence."88 Theories must be continually revised and modified in accord with newly observed facts and empirical evidence. At the same time, facts acquire

special meaning when examined in light of generalizations suggesting new relations and interpretations.
* -me gap that divides those immersed in empirical research from those who spin high level formal schemes is closely related to the inductive-deductive question. In one imaginative effort, two scholars attempt to bridge the gap by calling for "grounded theory." They argue that theory is best generated by constructing it out of the data of social research." Another important study addresses the issue by attempting to distinguish analytically between "general theory" and "auxiliary theory."'00 Implicit in all these attempts is the understanding that theory construction is a highly integrated process in which the various intellectual operations overlap and interlock with one another (see figure 2). Constant movement back and forth also occurs as one refines and reconsiders. Basic conceptualization, for example, is subject to change as the procedures of classification, generalization, and testing are engaged in. At any point in the process, new insights and intuitive flashes can suddenly emerge and fundamentally alter the investigation underway. The process of theory construction involves a pendulumlike movement between the specific and the general, the empirical and the formal, the climate of discovery and the exercise of testing.
The final step in the theory building process concerns the application of theory. By discovering patterns and explaining processes, theory assists in prediction. This, in turn, permits control. Theory contributes general guidelines upon which action and policy can be based. In the social sciences, the preoccupation with the construction of theories only for the sake of elegance is a luxury that we cannot afford. In a world where man limps through the darkness of uncertainty lit only by the flames of crisis, general beacons of enlightenment that serve to guide his steps are necessary. In the field of comparative politics, policy relevant theories of authority and change, for example, are among the most pressing concerns of scholars.
The Role of Theory o
The advantages that theory and the theorizing process offer to the study of comparative politics are many. Eight major contributions flow from the exercise of theory building. First, theory contributes greatly in the

FIGURE 2 SCIENTIFIC THEORY BUILDING
selection/ collection, ordering, and storing of data. It exists as a thAad that runs through masses of data drawing only the relevant facts to its path. Theory provides an important instrument of discrimination for selecting and collecting the relevant from the irrelevant in the sea of sociopolitical experience. This prevents the never ending process of compulsive fact accumulation that results in impressively huge but depressingly meaningless filing silos of data. Refined and rigorously developed theories also stand as repositories of ordered fact. They have been repeatedly measured against relevant data and these data then stand in at least this systematized arrangement. In this role, theory functions preeminently as a filtering device.
Second, theory building necessitates conceptual and methodological clarity. The theoretician is forced to rethink many of his basic concepts, assumplions.and hypotheses. The process of reworking and recasting verbal theories is essential for infusing rigor and precision into the theorizing process. This enterprise involves "clarifying concepts, eliminating or consolidating variables, translating existing verbal theories

into common languages, searching the literature for propositions, and looking for implicit assumptions connecting the major propositions in important theoretical works."101 This process of reexamination and clarification not only contributes to sounder theory, but also heightens communication and understanding between various theorists working with similar concepts and addressing similar problems.
The third advantage of theory is its relational stress which marks its special significance to comparative analysis. Theory always draws relations, builds connections, and states linkages. Facts and events are intertwined and interrelated. Comparative politics is fundamentally a study that relates patterns and processes that occur within two or more political contexts. The theorizing process is the most profound and systematic way of proceeding in this kind of study. Generalizations are essentially multicontextual, and their construction is what has come to transform configurative -descriptive political study into comparative political study.
Closely related to this third function of theory is the ability of theory to transcend particular time and spatial limitations. Analysis is not confined to describing and explaining one event in and of itself as it has occurred at one time and in one place. Instead, this event is viewed primarily from a very broad perspective that treats the particular happening as only one manifestation of something much larger. This question of perspective is important both for the confirmation of existing hypotheses and for the development of new hypotheses. By presenting a broader picture of relations and linkages, theory can utilize breadth to enhance depth. Theorizing is one way of transcending particularism and narrowness which stultify vision and creativity.
A fifth advantage of theory is that it is a form of explanation. In indicating that particular cases fall within certain general principles and in linking and ordering events, the theorizing process is confronting and answering key "why" questions. Whereas description is primarily concerned with the "what," the "when," and the "where," explanation concentrates upon the "why." Theory is an explanatory tool and as such it is a crucial aid towards building and furthering understanding.
Following from these last three functions is an advantage that enables man to attempt to foresee and forecast. Theory leads to prediction and enhances the ability to see ahead. By relating generalizations, theories discover and highlight patterns and trends, and it is on the basis of these

that man predicts. Accurate prediction in social and political life is very difficult but it can be furthered by placing more reliance upon sound theory building and often tested theoretical principles. Although prediction frequently rests on unanalyzed trends, such prediction is inevitably risky and is rarely reliable for more than very short periods of time and closely adjacent cases. Prediction over any longer term must rest on some kind of theory, for only theory provides an explanation of why we can expect the future to be as we predicted.
The seventh general contribution of theory is best described by Kurt Lewin, who once said that nothing is so practical as a good theory. Theory assists in policy-making and decision-making processes at all levels and in alt systems. As a simplifying and unifying intellectual tool, it restricts the range of choices and suggests new alternatives for action. This function has been referred to above as one important form of theory application.
Finally, theory and the entire process of theory building act as a provocative force for the selection of new problems and the stimulation of new research. Discovering, clarifying, classifying, relating, explaining, and testing breed an intellectual dynamism and curiosity that continually encourage new explorations. In the field of comparative politics, for example, the leading theoreticians have been those who are constantly settling upon new problems and generating new hypotheses. This is one less recognized reason why names like Almond, Huntington, Riggs, Eckstein, and Apter have so dominated the recent study of comparative politics.
If it performs any or all of these functions, then theory has been to some degree successful. Any serious attempt to engage systematically in the theorizing process is bound to be a positive experience. It intro- t duces a sensitivity to the importance of scientific procedure and rigor in the process of comparative analysis and explanation. The future of comparative political study rests upon effective theory building and the continuing development of a body of comparative political theory -
The Goals of This Study
A proliferation of varied approaches to the study of comparative politics has resulted in numerous and differing orientations to the construction of theory. These approaches have been traditional and modern, highly refined and hardly developed, explicit and implicit, more popular and less popular. In some cases, approaches have overlapped with one another; in other instances, they have been quite exclusive and separate. Often, concepts basic to one approach are utilized in another approach,

sometimes with the same meanings, sometimes with quite different meanings. Various approaches have offered differing strengths to comparative political analysis and theory building. In terms of relevance, rieor, and researchability, for example, there are marked differences in the kinds of contributions that flow from each theoretical approach.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty in analyzing the role of a particular approach in the study of comparative politics is the absence of any clear understanding of the nature of any one approach in relation to any other approach. This intellectual fuzziness has had an impeding and retarding effect upon the study of comparative politics for several reasons. First, it has had a negative impact upon theory building. A confusing jumble of approaches prohibits one from discerning which approach contributes most to which stage in the theorizing process. The lack of clear analytic distinctions here also fosters conceptual and procedural confusion which is destructive to rigorous theory building. Second, an unclear view of existing approaches tends to blind a scholar to his own particular theoretical orientations. He lacks a clear awareness of what approach or approaches he utilizes under what circumstances and in what form. Nor is he able to distinguish lucidly the general orientations of other observers and scholars. This kind of confusion is deepened by the fact that many scholars adopt a changing and eclectic hodgepodge of approaches that defy identification and clarification. The lack of awareness of basic orientating perspectives dulls the tools of comparative political analysis from the very beginning. Finally, a clouded view of theoretical approaches prevents one from making discriminating evaluations of research results in comparative politics- Unless the projects themselves present an explicit discussion of the approaches and procedures that led to the relevant conclusions, one is often unable to judge adequately the results put forth.
Chapters 3 through 7 in this study attempt to clarify, distinguish, relate, and evaluate five major theoretical approaches to the study of comparative politics: the political culture approach, the group approach, the elite approach, the class approach, the.functional and systems approaches. The presentation of these approaches will not rely upon the works of any particular practitioner, but rather will represent a distillation of relevant work through time. The major conceptual equipment of each approach will be carefully investigated and judged in terms of the tasks at hand. All approaches will be evaluated in terms of their capacity to confront, elucidate, and explain certain problems. The fundamental issue against which the approaches will be measured is the subject of the next chapter.

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